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I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is widely accepted as providing an adequate process of
dispute resolution. Indeed, there is a federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion, as manifested by the case law interpreting the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA).1 For many, arbitration may provide the only avenue
to justice. For others, it may provide the only efficient means of ob-
taining justice. Arbitration, at least theoretically, is less expensive,
less time-consuming and simpler than litigation in a judicial forum.2
The wholesale adoption of arbitration as an adequate dispute reso-
lution process is not, however, without its problems. While the gen-
eral framework of arbitration may be deemed adequate to protect the
rights of most parties in the arbitral forum, the specific procedures
applicable in that forum may not. The blanket endorsement of arbi-
tration cannot immunize those specific procedures from review to en-
sure their fairness, particularly when one of the parties is in
arbitration because of unequal bargaining power. The inequality that
may result from the uncritical acceptance of the specific rules and pro-
cedures governing arbitration is exemplified by arbitration in the se-
curities industry.
Arbitration is now the primary method used for the resolution of
disputes between investors and broker-dealers relating to the
purchase and sale of securities.3 Most of those arbitrations take place
in securities industry-sponsored arbitral forums, 4 and, for most inves-
tors, arbitration is compulsory.5
1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994); see infra notes 90-113 and accompanying text (discussing the his-
tory and purposes of the FAA).
2. See, e.g., Lynn Katzler, Should Mandatory Written Opinions Be Required in All Securities
Arbitrations?: The Practical and Legal Implications to the Securities Industry, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
151, 197 n.227 (1995) (citing a study that revealed that the average securities arbitration costs
$12,000 less than a court proceeding and takes less time to conclude).
3. See infra notes 43-56 and accompanying text (discussing the increasing use of SRO arbitral
forums).
4. The national securities exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (NYSE) and
the American Stock Exchange, Inc. (AMEX), as well as the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. (NASD), all commonly referred to as self-regulatory organizations (SROs), spon-
sor the arbitral forums. See infra notes 57-88 and accompanying text (discussing the procedures
used in SRO arbitration).
The fact that the securities industry is itself providing the arbitration facilities and that the
industry requires investors to use those same facilities if the investor has a dispute with a broker-
dealer has caused many to question the independence and fairness of SRO arbitration. See infra
notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
5. When opening up a margin or options account with a broker-dealer, most investors are
required to sign an agreement containing a clause obligating them to arbitrate at an SRO arbitral
forum all future controversies with the securities firm and with the individual broker-dealer. See
infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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With arbitration as the mainstay of dispute resolution for controver-
sies between investors and broker-dealers, much attention has been
focused on whether the investor is getting a fair shake in the industry-
sponsored arbitral forum.6 The conclusion, while not overwhelming
and certainly not indisputable, is that investors fare as well in SRO
arbitration as they would fare in an arbitral forum sponsored by an
organization deemed more independent of the securities industry7 or
in a judicial forum.8 This result, while comforting on some level, how-
ever, cannot end the inquiry into the fairness of SRO arbitration for it
fails to take into account the investor who is barred from arbitration
because the investor's claim is deemed ineligible according to the eli-
gibility rule, a rule of procedure adopted by the SROs which requires
the submission of a claim to arbitration within six years from the date
of the occurrence or event giving rise to it.9 The consequence of hav-
ing a claim found ineligible for SRO arbitration is that the investor is
completely deprived of a forum through which to seek redress for his
or her otherwise viable claim. Most courts that have addressed the
effect of having an ineligible claim have interpreted contract language
and SRO arbitration rules of procedure to bar the investor from liti-
gating the claim in both an arbitral and a judicial forum. 10 This result
is contrary to controlling federal law, further aggravates the unequal
bargaining power between the investor and the broker-dealer and re-
wards the unscrupulous broker-dealer who can successfully conceal
his or her wrongdoing.
6. See, e.g., J. Kirkland Grant, Securities Arbitration: Is Required Arbitration Fair to Inves-
tors?, 24 NEw ENG. L. REV. 389 (1989); William A. Gregory & William J. Schneider, Securities
Arbitration: A Need for Continued Reform, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1223 (1993); William C. Hermann,
Arbitration of Securities Disputes: Rodriguez and New Arbitration Rules Leave Investors Hold-
ing a Mixed Bag, 65 IND. L.J. 697 (1990); Terry Kassel & Elizabeth G. Armstrong, Securities
Arbitration: The Question of Fairness, 375 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 443, 1992); Constantine N. Katsoris, The Level Playing Field, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
419 (1989) [hereinafter Katsoris, The Level Playing Field]; Constantine N. Katsoris, Should Mc-
Mahon Be Revisited?, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1113 (1993) [hereinafter Katsoris, Should McMahon
Be Revisited?]; Perry E. Wallace, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, Rodriguez and the New
Rules: Can Investors' Rights Really Be Protected?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1199 (1990); Mark Weibel,
Federal Securities Arbitration: Does It Provide Adequate Relief?, 48 ARB. J. 54 (Mar. 1993).
7. For example, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) is a not-for-profit organization
that provides arbitration services for a variety of disputes, including disputes related to the
purchase and sale of a security. AMERICAN ARBITRATION AssOCIATION, SECURITIES ARBITRA-
"ION RULES (1993).
8. See infra notes 439-49 and accompanying text (discussing SRO arbitration versus a judicial
forum or AAA securities arbitration).
9. See infra notes 216-42 and accompanying text (discussing the eligibility rule and its origins).
10. See infra notes 356-413 and accompanying text (discussing the consequences of a finding
of ineligibility).
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When the Supreme Court blessed SRO arbitration as an alternative
for the resolution of disputes between investors and broker-dealers, it
did so partly on the presumption that customers do not give up sub-
stantive rights when agreeing in advance to arbitrate a dispute.' The
eligibility rule, however, as interpreted and applied by the courts and
the SROs, results in the loss of the most basic of substantive rights:
the right to seek redress for wrongful conduct, a right the investor
would have had but for the SRO eligibility rule. If such a result were
indeed compelled by the plain meaning of the SRO procedural rules
and by the contract language, the legitimacy of SRO arbitration, and
the Supreme Court's endorsement of it, would have to be seriously
questioned. That result, however, is not compelled. The SRO arbitra-
tion rules as a whole and the intent of the parties to the arbitration
agreement provide bases for the courts upon which to interpret the
eligibility rule in a manner that will protect the rights of the investor.
Due to the unequal bargaining position of investors, courts should
be obligated to give the SRO rules and the contract between the par-
ties an interpretation that will preserve, rather than destroy, the sub-
stantive rights of investors when compelled to go to arbitration. If the
failure to protect investors' rights continues, the health of our capital
markets may ultimately be affected. 12 And if the relinquishment of
the right to bring an otherwise timely action against a broker-dealer is
not enough to deter investors from investing, it may be enough to
cause them to shun arbitration when and if they can, and thereby de-
prive themselves of the benefits of an alternative dispute resolution
procedure that can, if done properly, provide quick and inexpensive
justice. Alternatively, they may forfeit their claims altogether, which,
of course, would undermine the goals of the federal securities laws.
11. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shear-
son/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); see also infra notes 177-209 and accom-
panying text (discussing Rodriguez de Quijas and McMahon).
12. As aptly stated by Professor Constantine N. Katsoris in the forward to the NYSE Sympo-
sium on Arbitration in the Securities Industry: "The public's perception of fairness, however,
must be zealously guarded, for it extends far beyond the issue of arbitration. It goes to the very
heart of the public's trust in the securities markets themselves. This trust must be preserved for
those markets to stay healthy." New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Symposium on Arbitration in the
Securities Industry, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1995) [hereinafter NYSE Symposium]; see
also Gregory & Schneider, supra note 6, at 1224 ("[T]he investing public perceives forced arbi-
tration of their disputes with brokers as inherently unfair, which undermines the integrity of the
financial markets and serves to impede the flow of capital upon which our economic system
depends."); Settling Disputes Between Customers and Registered Brokers and Dealers, Ex-
change Act Release No. 12528, 9 S.E.C. Docket 833 (June 9, 1976) (indicating that an efficient
system for the resolution of disputes will contribute to the increased participation of individual
investors in the securities markets).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
This article will first describe SRO arbitration, its prevalence in
resolving disputes between investors and broker-dealers, and the his-
tory of the enactment of uniform procedural rules to govern such dis-
putes.13 It will then trace the Supreme Court's endorsement of SRO
arbitration and the impact of the evolving jurisprudence of the FAA
on that endorsement. 14 The change in the Court's attitude from one
of hostility to one of acceptance and endorsement of arbitration will
be analyzed as well. 15 The article will then examine the eligibility rule,
one of the procedural rules applicable in all SRO arbitral forums.16 It
will focus on two separate issues: (i) who should decide eligibility, the
judge or arbitrator; and (ii) what the consequences should be to an
investor whose claim has been found ineligible according to SRO rules
of procedure. 17 It will be argued that, consistent with federal law, the
arbitrator, and not the court, should make the determination regard-
ing the eligibility of the investor's claim. 18 The astounding conse-
quence of a finding of ineligibility will then be examined. 19 It will be
argued that the courts are improperly depriving the investor with an
ineligible claim the right to proceed with that claim in a judicial fo-
rum.2 0 The inconsistency in the courts' treatment of the contract lan-
guage in deciding the two issues will also be highlighted.21 The article
will then discuss the position of the Securities Industry Conference on
Arbitration (SICA), the original drafter of the eligibility rule, on these
two issues22 and will demonstrate how the SROs are improperly refus-
ing to adopt SICA's position.23 The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission's (SEC) position, or, more appropriately, the lack thereof, will
also be examined and studies concerning the fairness of SRO arbitra-
tion will be discussed to the extent of demonstrating that such studies
are indeed not a reliable indication of fairness with respect to the in-
vestor with an ineligible claim.24 The article will conclude with a sug-
gestion, borrowed from federalism jurisprudence, as to how the
procedural rules of the arbitral forum should be analyzed to ensure
that such rules do not tread upon state or federally created substantive
13. See infra parts I.A-B.
14. See infra parts ILA-B.
15. See infra parts IILA-B.
16. See infra parts lV.A-B.
17. See infra parts IV.B.1-4.
18. See infra part IV.B.1.
19. See infra part IV.B.2.
20. See infra part IV.B.2.
21. See infra part IV.B.2.
22. See infra part IV.B.3.
23. See infra part IV.B.3.
24. See infra parts IV.B.4-5.
[Vol. 46:109
1996]ELIGIBILITY RULE IN SECURITIES ARBITRATION 115
rights.25 It will be argued that the Supreme Court's endorsement of
SRO arbitration generally should not immunize specific procedural
rules, such as the eligibility rule, from examination.2 6 That argument
will treat the SRO arbitral forum, with its "consensual jurisdiction," as
the equivalent of a state or federal forum and will suggest that the
arbitral forum also be subject to the rule that prohibits each forum
from adopting procedural rules that effectively deprive a party of a
substantive right. 27
II. SRO ARBITRATION
Arbitration administered by an SR0 28 has been around for almost
125 years,29 becoming more common among SROs in the last 35
years.30 However, it was not until the Supreme Court's decision in
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon,31 where the Court, by up-
holding the use of predispute agreements to arbitrate violations of
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, embraced and legitimized arbitra-
tion administered by the SROs, that the fairness of such arbitration
began to be seriously questioned by, among others, legal scholars,32
25. See infra part V.
26. See infra part V.
27. See infra part V.
28. An SRO is defined as "any national securities exchange, registered securities association,
or registered clearing agent, or ... the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board." Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(26), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(26) (1994) (Exchange Act). The NASD is, to
date, the only registered securities association. 6 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIOMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION 2795 (3d ed. 1990).
SROs are part of the Exchange Act's dual system of regulation. With SEC oversight, the
SROs registered with the SEC are responsible for policing the conduct of their members by
enforcing the SRO's own rules as well as the securities laws. SROs also monitor trading in the
markets, propose rules to the SEC regarding the administration of their organizations, and, as
discussed, provide arbitration facilities. General Accounting Office, Pub. No. GGD-92-94, Se-
curities Arbitration: How Investors Fare 104 (May 11, 1992) [hereinafter GAO Report] (technical
comments of the SEC Division of Market Regulation). See generally Exchange Act § 19, 15
U.S.C. § 78s (1994).
29. PHILIP J. HOBLIN, JR., SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES, CASES 1-2
(2d ed. 1992) (stating that the NYSE began offering arbitration for the resolution of disputes
between its members and their customers in 1872).
30. Id. In 1964, nearly 100 years after the NYSE began administering its arbitration program,
AMEX followed suit. Id. The NASD began its program in 1968. Id.
In addition to the NYSE, AMEX and the NASD, the Chicago Board of Options Exchange,
the Municipal Securities Rule Board and the Boston, Chicago, Pacific and Philadelphia Stock
Exchanges also administer arbitration programs. Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration,
Eighth Report of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission 2 (June 1994) [hereinafter Eighth Report].
31. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
32. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the opinions of legal scholars regard-
ing SRO arbitration).
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members of Congress, 33 and state legislators.3 That questioning con-
tinues today.35 While it is unsettling that the fairness of SRO arbitra-
tion with respect to state statutory and common law claims, which
claims were already being arbitrated in SRO forums, was not ad-
dressed earlier, it is understandable that the McMahon decision
caused the issue to come to the forefront. McMahon "revolution-
ize[d] securities litigation" 36 and required arbitration of thousands of
cases 37 at industry-sponsored and paid-for arbitral forums according
to industry rules. The sheer volume of cases is not the only reason
why securities arbitration has come under greater scrutiny than gen-
eral commercial or labor arbitration. 38 The difficulty and complexity
of the issues involved 39 and the mandatory nature of the predispute
arbitration clause 40 are additional reasons. However, the principal
33. Following McMahon, Representatives Boucher (D. Va.), Markey (D. Ma.) and Dingell
(D. Mich.) introduced a bill which sought to amend the Exchange Act to "provide for the fair,
equitable and voluntary arbitration of customer-broker disputes." H.R. REP. No. 4960, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). The bill was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce,
whose Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, held three days of hearings. Arbitra-
tion Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House
of Representatives Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [hereinafter
Hearings]. The purpose of the bill was to, among other things, prohibit the practice of making
the signing of a predispute arbitration agreement a condition for doing business with a securities
firm. Gregory & Schneider, supra note 6, at 1228.
34. In response to McMahon, Massachusetts enacted legislation regulating the use of predis-
pute arbitration clauses. Gregory & Schneider, supra note 6, at 1244. That legislation was struck
down as preempted by the FAA. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1120 (1st
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 956 (1990).
35. See generally NYSE Symposium, supra note 12.
36. G. Richard Shell, The Role of Public Law in Private Dispute Resolution: Reflections on
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 397, 398 (1988).
37. See NYSE Symposium, supra note 12, at 1507 (stating that securities arbitration was trans-
formed overnight from a voluntary procedure to a mandatory obligation) (panelist Professor
Katsoris).
38. Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World of Securities
Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095, 1107 (1993). The circumstances typically surrounding the
execution of the agreement to arbitrate in the commercial or labor context are in marked con-
trast to those surrounding an investor's execution of the arbitration agreement. In the commer-
cial and labor context, the agreement containing the arbitration clause is mutually negotiated
and may even be mutually drafted. In the securities context on the other hand, the investor
plays no role whatsoever in the drafting or even the negotiation of the agreement. Id. at 1096.
39. Before the McMahon decision, securities arbitration involved state common law claims,
such as breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, claims for violation of state statutory law
and claims for violation of SRO rules. McMahon added to the mix claims based on violations of
the Exchange Act and of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 482 U.S. 220 (1987). The Supreme Court has since
found arbitrable claims based on violations of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), Rodri-
guez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), and claims based on age
discrimination, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
40. See infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text (discussing the use of mandatory predispute
arbitration clauses with individual investors).
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reason seems to be that an overwhelming number of securities arbitra-
tions take place at SRO administered forums.41 The perceived lack of
independence of these arbitration programs has caused many to ques-
tion their overall fairness to investors.42
A. Widespread Use of SRO Arbitral Forums
The vast majority of disputes between an investor and a broker-
dealer are resolved in an SRO arbitral forum.43 This is because most
securities firms require their customers, as a precondition to doing
business with the firm, to sign a Customer Agreement or other docu-
ment agreeing to arbitrate before an SRO arbitral forum any dispute
he or she may have with the broker-dealer or the securities firm.44
41. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (discussing the increase in arbitrations be-
tween 1980 and 1994).
42. The concern over the lack of independence of SRO arbitral forums led the Chairman of
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and its Subcommittee on Telecommunications
and Finance and the Chairman and four members of the Senate Committee on Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs to request that the General Accounting Office (GAO) compare arbitra-
tion awards rendered at SRO arbitral forums and compare the results with securities arbitration
awards rendered at the AAA to determine if there was industry bias. GAO Report, supra note
28, at 4; see infra notes 444-49 and accompanying text (discussing the results of the GAO study).
The public's perception of unfairness also caused the securities industry itself to evaluate
whether it should create a single independent arbitral forum. Katsoris, Should McMahon Be
Revisited?, supra note 6, at 1121. It has also caused the SEC to encourage broker-dealers to
include the AAA in the choice of forums granted to the investor in the predispute arbitration
clause. Securities Uniformity; Annual Conference on Uniformity of Securities Law, Securities
Act Release No. 6883, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,715 (Mar. 12,
1991). This was done even though the SEC has no oversight authority over the AAA. Katsoris,
The Level Playing Field, supra note 6, at 470.
43. See, e.g., Report of the Arbitraton Policy Task Force to the Board of Governors National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [1995-1996 Transfer
Binder], 87,735, at 87,433 (Mar. 6, 1996) [hereinafter Task Force Report] (noting that arbitra-
tion is the principal means of resolving disputes between investors and securities firms); see also
GAO Report, supra note 28, at 4 (finding that arbitration is the most frequently used method of
resolving securities disputes); Hearings, supra note 33, at 476 ("SRO sponsored arbitration [has]
becom[e] the principle forum for the resolution of investor grievances against their brokers.")
(statement of David S. Ruder, former Chairman of the SEC).
44. See, e.g., GAO Report, supra note 28, at 28-30 (finding that arbitration agreements are
preconditions to opening a customer account); Task Force Report, supra note 43, at 87,433-34;
Grant, supra note 6, at 395; Gregory & Schneider, supra note 6, at 1228; Constantine N. Katsoris,
The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 279, 292 (1984) (recognizing
that such agreements are conditions to opening an account); NYSE Symposium, supra note 12, at
1513, 1519 (panelists Theodore A. Kresbach and Theodore E. Eppenstein, respectively) (both
panelists acknowledging that brokerage firms require investors to sign predispute arbitration
agreements as a condition to doing business); Margo E. K. Reder, Securities Law and Arbitra-
tion The Enforceability of Predispute Arbitration Clauses in Broker-Customer Agreements, 1990
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 91, 96 (noting that customer agreements usually require arbitration before
an industry-sponsored association); Susan Antilla, At the Bar; Brokerage Firms Steer Dissatisfied
Customers Away From Court But In Only One Direction, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1995, at A29.
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In 1992, the GAO surveyed small, medium and large firms regard-
ing their use of predispute arbitration clauses.45 With respect to indi-
vidual investors opening cash accounts after December 1, 1990, a
substantial minority of small and medium firms required the signing of
an agreement containing an arbitration clause;46 a small percentage of
large firms required it.47 The numbers were significantly higher with
respect to margin and options accounts: all large firms, ninety percent
of medium firms, and over seventy percent of small firms required
customers to sign agreements containing predispute arbitration
clauses.48 Large securities firms requiring the signing of a predispute
arbitration clause seldom gave the investor the choice of the AAA as
a forum; medium firms did more often. 49
These numbers make it clear that the customer buying on margin or
opening an options account really has no choice but to agree to arbi-
trate before an SRO forum. While that customer may try opening an
account with another securities firm, his or her options are clearly
quite limited. 50 Furthermore, any attempt to negotiate a waiver of the
arbitration clause itself will not be successful. The GAO Report
found that most securities firms never or almost never waived or ne-
gotiated the clause with individual investors.5 1
The practice among the securities firms of requiring execution of an
agreement to arbitrate future controversies at an SRO arbitral forum
as a precondition to doing business, which has been upheld by the
Supreme Court,52 has resulted in a staggering number of arbitrations
being conducted at SRO forums. In 1980, SROs handled 830 arbitra-
45. GAO Report, supra note 28, at 22. The size of the firm was categorized on the basis of its
number of registered retail representatives. Id.
46. Thirty-seven percent of small firms and forty-six percent of medium firms required the
customer to agree to arbitrate when opening a cash account. Id. at 28-29.
47. Only eleven percent of large firms required cash account customers to sign an arbitration
agreement. Id.
48. Id. at 31-32. The number of investors signing predispute arbitration agreements is ex-
pected to increase with the increase in the use of custody accounts, which most investors will sign
to ensure timely settlement of trades. Task Force Report, supra note 43, at 87,436.
49. GAO Report, supra note 28, at 31-32.
50. See, e.g., NYSE Symposium, supra note 12, at 1519 (noting that most big brokerage firms
have the same policies concerning arbitration).
51. GAO Report, supra note 28, at 30. The GAO Report found that in 1990 the one large firm
that required its individual investors to sign cash account agreements containing the predispute
clause almost never waived or negotiated it. Id. Seventy-five percent of the medium firms and
ninety-six percent of the small firms that required cash account customers to sign the clause
reported that they never or almost never waived or negotiated the clause. Id. For margin and
options accounts, over seventy-five percent of the firms, regardless of size, never or almost
never, waived or negotiated the clause. Id.; see also NYSE Symposium, supra note 12, at 1519.
52. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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tions. 53 That number increased by almost 800 percent in 1994, bring-
ing the number of cases to 6,486.54 The AAA handled an additional
274 cases,55 only 4.2 percent of the total number of arbitrations filed
with the SROs in 1994.56
B. Procedures Used in SRO Arbitrations
The predispute arbitration clause will typically give the customer
the choice of two or more SRO forums and will indicate that the arbi-
tration procedures of the chosen forum will govern the dispute. 57 Re-
gardless of that choice of forum, however, the procedures that will
53. Eighth Report, supra note 30, at 29.
54. This figure does not include the number of filings at the Philadelphia Stock Exchange and
the Chicago (Midwest) Stock Exchange, for which numbers were unavailable. Deborah Masucci
& Robert S. Clemente, Securities Arbitration at the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.-Administration and Procedures, at 291, 298 (PLI Corp.
Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 899, 1995).
55. George H. Friedman & Florence M. Peterson, When You Have a Choice of Forum: The
Differences Between Securities Arbitration at the AAA and the SROs, at 555, 559 (PLI Corp. Law
and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 899, 1995). The number of filings at the AAA in 1994
drastically decreased from an all time high of 635 filings in 1993. Id. Brokerage firm restriction
of the AAA as a choice of forum in form contracts is one reason attributed to the decline in
cases filed with the AAA. Id. The AAA's securities arbitration program may be abandoned if
filings do not increase. Task Force Report, supra note 43, at 87,436 n.12.
56. As the following chart demonstrates, during the last decade the percentage of securities
cases handled by the AAA never exceeded more than ten percent of the total number of cases
handled by the SROs. The recent dramatic drop in the securities cases filed with the AAA in
1994 basically puts the AAA back into the position it held in the mid-1980's-before the
Supreme Court's blessing of arbitration for claims based on the federal securities laws.
SRO Composite Figures AAA Figures/Percentage of SRO Total
1986 2,837 119/(4.2%)
1987 4,357 187/(4.3%)
1988 6,097 495/(8.1%)
1989 5,404 440/(8.1%)
1990 5,332 381/(7.4%)
1991 5,869 586/(10%)
1992 5,451 485/(8.9%)
1993 6,561 635/(9.7%)
1994 6,486 274/(4.2%)
See Eighth Report, supra note 30, at 29 (providing the SRO Composite Figures) and George H.
Friedman, Discovery in Arbitration, at 389, 391 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Handbook Series
No. 899, 1994) (providing the AAA Figures).
57. See J. KIRKLAND GRANT, SECURITIES ARBITRATION FOR BROKERS, ATTORNEYS, AND IN-
VESTORs 80-81 (1994) (including a standard client agreement containing a predispute arbitration
clause); see also Notice to Broker-Dealers Concerning Clauses in Customer Agreements which
Provide for Arbitration of Future Disputes, Exchange Act Release No. 15984 [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 82,125, at n.4, (July 2, 1979) (noting that a typical arbitration
agreement allows the investor to choose from a list of several arbitration organizations). It is the
SEC's position and the rules of the various SROs to allow a customer to arbitrate any claim
against any firm or industry professional at any SRO at which that firm or professional is a
member. Roney & Co. v. Goren, 875 F.2d 1218, 1222-23 (6th Cir. 1989).
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govern the arbitration will, for the most part, be the same. All SROs
that sponsor arbitration programs have adopted, with the approval of
the SEC, the Uniform Code of Arbitration (UCA) 58 developed by
SICA, a task force created by the securities industry for the purpose
of responding to SEC concerns over the lack of uniformity in the rules
governing arbitration among the various SROs.59
The SEC, in response to a directive from President Ford regarding
regulatory reform and agency responsiveness to consumers, 60 created
the Office of Consumer Affairs and empowered it to study and make
recommendations to the SEC with respect to the development of a
"model and uniform system of dispute grievance procedures for the
adjudication of small claims."' 61 The SEC also sought comments on
the development of such a program from the public.62
The Office of Consumer Affairs made certain recommendations to
the SEC for the resolution of small dollar amount claims.63 Specifi-
cally, the Office recommended, among other things, that a new,
"quasi-independent" entity be established by the SROs to administer
58. See In re Philadelphia Stock Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 16906, 20 S.E.C.
Docket 437 (June 19, 1980); In re National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 16860, 20 S.E.C. Docket 233 (May 30, 1980); In re Pacific Stock Exch., Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 16767, 19 S.E.C. Docket 1297 (April 28, 1980); In re Boston Stock Exch., Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 16671, 19 S.E.C. Docket 922 (Mar. 17, 1980); In re Cincinnati Stock
Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 16670, 19 S.E.C. Docket 922 (Mar. 17, 1980); In re Chi-
cago Board Options Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 16606, 19 S.E.C. Docket 758 (Feb.
25, 1980); In re Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, Exchange Act Release No. 16570, 19
S.E.C. Docket 573 (Feb. 13, 1980); In re Midwest Stock Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
16503, 19 S.E.C. Docket 327 (Jan. 16, 1980); In re American Stock Exch., Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 16502, 19 S.E.C. Docket 326 (Jan. 16, 1980); In re New York Stock Exch., Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 16390, 18 S.E.C. Docket 1197 (Nov. 30, 1979).
59. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussing that SICA was created by the
securities industry and was initially composed of representatives from ten SROs, the SIA and
three members of the public). For a history of SICA, see Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA: The
First Twenty Years, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 483 (1996) [hereinafter Katsoris, SICA].
60. Settling Disputes Between Customers and Registered Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act
Release No. 12528, 9 S.E.C. Docket 833, 833 (June 9, 1976).
61. Id. The Commission clearly expected that a uniform system would accomplish more than
just the resolution of small claims between investors and broker-dealers:
The establishment of an efficient system for resolving disputes involving small sums
should contribute significantly to the protection of investors (which is the objective of
the federal securities laws), to the increased participation of individual investors in the
securities market (which the securities industry has often encouraged), and to the con-
duct of a securities business in a manner that observes high standards of commercial
honor... and that promotes just and equitable principles of trade.
Id. at 834.
62. Id.
63. An Integrated Nationwide System For the Resolution of Investor Disputes, Exchange Act
Release No. 12974 [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 80,807 (Nov. 15,
1976) [hereinafter Release No. 12974].
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a system of professional small-claims adjusters, who would be empow-
ered to make settlement offers to consumers. 64 The SEC agreed in
principle with the dispute resolution system suggested by the Office of
Consumer Affairs.65 However, before the SEC commenced rule-mak-
ing proceedings or requested that the SROs amend their own rules to
provide for such a system, 66 it sought comments from all interested
persons on the proposal.67
The comments the SEC received caused it to abandon implementa-
tion of the program proposed by the Office of Consumer Affairs. In-
stead, the SEC deferred to the securities industry itself the job of
developing and implementing a nationwide system for dispute resolu-
tion.68 Apparently, the views expressed at a public forum favored an
industry-sponsored dispute resolution system instead of the creation
of the "quasi-independent" administrative agency proposed by the Of-
fice of Consumer Affairs.69
The NYSE and the NASD proposed that a conference or a task
force be created with industry representatives and members of the
public to develop a single system for the resolution of customer dis-
putes.70 Although it had extensive authority over the SROs, the SEC
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. The Exchange Act empowers the SEC to amend the rules of the SROs:
The Commission, by rule, may abrogate, add to, and delete from.., the rules of a self-
regulatory organization ... as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate to in-
sure the fair administration of the self-regulatory organization, to conform its rules to
the requirements of this chapter and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to
such organization, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter ....
Exchange Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1994).
This provision was added to the Exchange Act in 1975 to clarify and strengthen the SEC's
oversight authority over the SROs. S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 22, 31 (1975) reprinted
in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 200, 209; see also Catherine McGuire & Robert A. Love, Dispute
Resolution Between Investors and Broker-Dealers in the United States Securities Markets, 14 HAS-
TINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 431, 434 (1990) (stating that due to section 19, the SEC has exer-
cised broad oversight authority over SRO arbitration).
67. Release No. 12974, supra note 63, at 1.
68. Implementation of an Investor Dispute Resolution System, Exchange Act Release No.
13470 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,136 (Apr. 26, 1977) [hereinafter
Release No. 13470]. The Commission stated: "Although the Commission does have extensive
authority over the self-regulatory organizations, their rules and procedures .... it is of the view
that it would not be useful at this time to interpose itself in this area since the industry has
manifested its intention to take affirmative action." Id. at 87,907.
69. Id.
70. Id. The purpose of the conference would be to:
[C]onsider how the securities industry can respond to the Commission's concerns that
there be more effective, efficient and economical dispute resolution procedures avail-
able to individual investors, including a uniform arbitration code and procedures, a
simplified system for the resolution of disputes involving small dollar amounts, and
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agreed to defer its own action on the assumption that: (i) investors, or
their representatives, would be included in the conference; (ii) the
conference byproduct would be one which would implement a simpli-
fied nationwide system for dispute resolution along the lines set out by
the SEC; and (iii) the proposed system would be in the public inter-
est.71 If the securities industry failed to achieve the SEC's objectives,
the SEC indicated that it would take action as appropriate to imple-
ment a nationwide dispute resolution system.72 As it turned out, the
SEC did not have to take action. In April 1977, SICA, composed of
representatives from the ten SROs, 73 a representative of the Securities
Industry Association (SIA)74 and three members of the public, 75 was
formed 76 and it carried out the SEC's objectives. 77 The consequence
of SICA satisfying the SEC's objectives, of course, was the complete
abandonment of the plan proposed by the Office of Consumer Affairs
and, with that abandonment, went any hope that investors may have
had of having an independent, or even "quasi-independent," agency
to resolve their disputes.
As requested, SICA developed streamlined uniform procedures for
the arbitration of small dollar amount claims.78 Thereafter, SICA de-
veloped the UCA for the resolution of all disputes, 79 regardless of dol-
other means of simplifying the mechanisms for resolution of customer disputes with
brokers and dealers.
Id.
71. Release No. 13470, supra note 68.
72. Id.
73. Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, Second Report of the Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Proposal for a Uniform
Code of Arbitration 2 (Dec. 28, 1978) [hereinafter Second Report].
74. Id.
75. Id. Peter R. Celia, Jr., Mortimer Goodman and Professor Constantine N. Katsoris were
selected as the public members because of their experience and interest in securities arbitration.
Id. An additional public member was added in 1983. Katsoris, Should McMahon Be Revisited?,
supra note 6, at 1117 n.27. The fact that the representatives from the securities industry and its
trade association overwhelmingly outnumbered the members of the public apparently did not
concern the SEC.
76. Second Report, supra note 73, at 2.
77. Grant, supra note 6, at 482.
78. Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, Report of the Securities Industry Confer-
ence on Arbitration to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Proposals to Establish a Uni-
form System for the Resolution of Customer Disputes Involving Small Claims (Nov. 15, 1977).
These procedures were adopted by the SROs and approved by the Commission. See, e.g., In re
American Stock Exch., Inc. and In re New York Stock Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
14737, 14 S.E.C. Docket 985 (May 4, 1978).
79. See Grant, supra note 6, at 482 (indicating that SICA went beyond the SEC's original plan
to provide uniform procedures for small dollar amount claims when it adopted the UCA for the
resolution of all disputes); see also Katsoris, The Level Playing Field, supra note 6, at 427-29.
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lar amount,80 which was adopted by all SROs81 and approved by the
SEC.82 In approving SRO adoption of the UCA, the SEC found it to
be consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act, particularly
with section 6(b)(5), which requires that the rules of an Exchange pro-
mote "just and equitable principles of trade. '83 SICA did not disband
upon the completion of the UCA. Rather, SICA has continued "to
review the operations of the Code and SRO arbitration and to con-
sider amendments in light of experiences of the users of arbitration, to
evaluate and respond to case law and other developments in arbitra-
tion, and to consider suggestions of the public and the SEC."84
The SEC considered the development of the UCA by SICA to be a
substantial improvement over the procedures that were being used by
the various SROs and an important step toward the establishment of a
uniform system.85 Professor Katsoris has analogized SICA to the
80. See generally Second Report, supra note 73, at 5-6. Prior to the adoption of the UCA,
arbitration procedures varied from forum to forum. Katsoris, The Level Playing Field, supra
note 6, at 424-26. The UCA "incorporated and harmonized the rules of the various SROs and
codified procedures" previously followed by SROs but not part of their formal rules. Id. at 429.
81. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the adoption of the UCA by all
SROs). As a member of SICA, an SRO is not obligated to agree with or adopt everything SICA
proposes. Each individual SRO must make a determination as to whether to adopt a rule pro-
posed by SICA. 1d. There have been instances where no SRO has adopted an amendment to
the UCA as proposed by SICA. See infra note 419 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the approval of the UCA by the
SEC). If an SRO wishes to make a change to its rules governing arbitration, it must file with the
SEC the proposed rule change. Exchange Act § 19(b)(1)-(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1)-(b)(2)
(1994). Upon receipt, the SEC will publish notice of the proposed rule change and will give
interested persons an opportunity to comment. Id. Thereafter, the SEC will either approve the
change or institute proceedings to determine whether it should be disapproved. Id. The SEC
may not approve an SRO rule change unless it is consistent with the objectives of the Exchange
Act. Id.
83. In re New York Stock Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 16390, 18 S.E.C. Docket
1197, 1199 (Nov. 30, 1979) [hereinafter Release No. 16390]; see Exchange Act § 6(b)(5), 15
U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1994). In a later release discussing, in part, the SEC's approval of the SROs'
adoption of the UCA, the SEC stated: "The Commission continues to support the use of arbi-
tration as an important means for the resolution of disputes between broker-dealers and their
customers. The Code provides an economical alternative to litigation and fair and efficient pro-
cedures for the resolution of these disputes." Disclosure Regarding Recourse to the Federal
Courts Notwithstanding Arbitration Clauses in Broker-Dealer Customer Agreements, Exchange
Act Release No. 19813 [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,356 (May 26,
1983).
84. Eighth Report, supra note 30, at 3; see also Katsoris, Should McMahon Be Revisited?,
supra note 6, at 1119 (noting that it was necessary for SICA to continue to monitor the arbitra-
tion process). For example, SICA proposed numerous changes to the UCA following the Mc-
Mahon decision, some of which were prompted by the SEC itself. Changes were made to the
rules regarding, among other things, discovery, awards, records of the proceedings and prehear-
ing conferences. Grant, supra note 6, at 508-19.
85. See Release No. 16390, supra note 83, at 1199. The SEC was obviously pleased enough
with the UCA to abandon the plans developed by its own Office of Consumer Affairs.
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"cop on the beat," whose stabilizing influence, and whose attempt to
level the playing field between investors and broker-dealers has "re-
injected investor confidence in the SRO arbitration system. '' 86
The creation of SICA, the development of the UCA and the SEC's
oversight of SRO arbitration rules undoubtedly played a role in the
Supreme Court's endorsement of SRO arbitration for the resolution
of claims based on the federal securities laws. Even Justice Blackmun
in his dissenting opinion in McMahon conceded that SRO arbitration
had improved in the almost thirty-five years since the Supreme Court
first prohibited the arbitration of Securities Act claims. 87 He stated:
"It is true that arbitration procedures in the securities industry have
improved since Wilko's day. Of particular importance has been the
development of a code of arbitration by the Commission with the
assistance of representatives of the securities industry and the
public." 88
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S ENDORSEMENT OF
SRO ARBITRATION
In order to understand and analyze the Supreme Court's endorse-
ment of SRO arbitration, it is first necessary to review generally the
FAA89 and the history of its impact on securities arbitration.
A. The FAA
The FAA was enacted in 1925 to end judicial hostility to predispute
arbitration agreements. 90 Before the FAA's enactment, agreements
to arbitrate a future controversy, or predispute arbitration agree-
ments, were revocable up until the time the arbitrators made their
award.91 The FAA made agreements to arbitrate enforceable in fed-
86. Katsoris, Should McMahon Be Revisited?, supra note 6, at 1152.
87. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 258 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing); see also Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
88. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 258 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
89. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
90. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974). The FAA, enacted pursuant to
Congress' power under the commerce clause, Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufac-
turing Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967), was drafted by a committee of the American Bar Associa-
tion, H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 96] and was
modeled after the New York arbitration law enacted five years earlier. S. REP. No. 536, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3 (1924) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 536].
91. S. REP. No. 536, supra note 90, at 2. The reluctance of American courts to enforce agree-
ments to arbitrate has been traced back to the English common law. English courts permitted
revocation due to the fear that enforcement would oust them of jurisdiction. C. EDWARD
FLETCHER, ARBrTRATING SECURmEs DispuTEs 15 (1990).
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eral court and sought to put such agreements on the "same footing as
other contracts." 92
The FAA provides that an agreement to arbitrate a future contro-
versy contained in any maritime transaction or a "contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce" 93 shall be "valid, irrevocable and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any such contract." 94 It further provides procedures
for the enforcement of such agreements. The FAA empowers a court,
upon application, to stay any pending action if the issue therein is ref-
erable to arbitration 95 and to compel arbitration in the event a recalci-
trant party to an arbitration agreement refuses to submit the
controversy to arbitration. 96 The court is also given the authority to
confirm 97 or vacate98 an award. Vacator of an award is permitted
under very limited circumstances. 99 Significantly, the FAA does not
92. H.R. REP. No. 96, supra note 90, at 1.
93. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The term commerce is defined as:
[C]ommerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the
United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and an-
other, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the
District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
The Supreme Court recently considered the issue of the meaning of the phrase "contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce" in Allied Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct.
834, 836 (1995). There, the Court determined that the phrase should be read broadly, extending
the FAA's reach to the limits of Congress' commerce powers rather than restricting its meaning
to those transactions contemplated by the parties to involve interstate commerce. Id. Accord-
ingly, the Court upheld arbitration of a consumer dispute despite state law to the contrary. Id.
Even prior to Dobson, almost all securities transactions were found to involve interstate com-
merce. FLETCHER, supra note 91, at 46. Courts had held that a purchase or sale of a security on
a national securities exchange constituted a transaction involving commerce as did an agreement
between a brokerage firm and an investor. Id. at 47; see also Grant, supra note 6, at 416-17
(stating that securities transactions that utilize the medium of the national securities exchanges
or the facilities of the mails, telephone and telegraph clearly fall within the FAA).
94. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
95. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
96. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
97. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994).
98. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
99. An award may be vacated:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means.
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them.
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to
the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced.
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create new rights, 100 nor does it require that parties arbitrate dis-
putes.101 Instead, it merely provides a remedy to enforce an agree-
ment to arbitrate.102 Although the FAA was enacted in 1925, the
supremacy of the FAA over state law and the controlling substantive
law was made explicit only in a series of cases in the last fifteen years.
In the landmark case of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mer-
cury Construction Corp. ,103 the Supreme Court held that the FAA cre-
ates a body of federal substantive law evidencing a strong federal
policy favoring arbitration which is applicable in both state and fed-
eral court. 04 There, the Court indicated that any doubts concerning
the arbitrability of an issue should be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion. 05 In often cited language, the Court stated:
Federal law in the terms of the Arbitration Act governs [the issue of
whether the suit was arbitrable] in either state or federal court....
Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substan-
tive or procedural policies to the contrary. The effect of the section
is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, appli-
cable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.
... The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law,
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be re-
solved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability. 10 6
One year later, the Court demonstrated the consequence of its
holding in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital regarding the supremacy
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that
a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(a)(4) (1994).
100. 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924).
101. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (stating that the
FAA does not mandate the arbitration of all claims but merely the enforcement of "privately
negotiated arbitration agreements").
102. 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924).
103. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
104. Id. at 24. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Floor & Conklin Manufacturing Corp., 388 U.S. 395
(1967), the Court had previously held that in a diversity action, the FAA controlled the issue of
whether the arbitrator or the court should decide if a contract containing an arbitration clause
was fraudulently induced.
While the FAA creates substantive federal law, it does not create an independent basis for
federal subject matter jurisdiction. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25 n.32.
105. Id. at 24-25.
106. Id.
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of the FAA.10 7 In Southland Corp. v. Keating,'08 the Court held that
the FAA gives it the power to create federal substantive law that is
applicable in both federal and state court. 0 9 Accordingly, federal law
preempts conflicting or contrary state law: "In creating a substantive
rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to
foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of
arbitration agreements."' 10 Thus, states are precluded from requiring
a judicial forum when parties have previously agreed to arbitrate their
dispute."'
The result in Southland is not overwhelmingly supported. Indeed,
the Supreme Court was asked recently to overrule Southland on the
basis that the FAA is a procedural, not substantive, statute and, like
other federal procedural statutes, is applicable only in federal court."
12
The Court declined and thereby reinforced the supremacy of the
107. The consequence was not apparent in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. inasmuch as that
case was brought in federal, not state, court. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 35 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
108. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). There, 7-Eleven franchisees sued the franchisor in California state
court for, inter alia, fraud, breach of contract and violations of the California Franchise Invest-
ment Law. Id. at 4. The agreement between the parties required arbitration of the disputes, but
the California Franchise Investment Law prohibited arbitration of claims made pursuant to it.
Id.
109. Id. at 12.
110. Id. at 16. The Court in Southland found that the FAA preempted the California
Franchise Investment Law. Id.; accord Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1656
(1996) (stating that the FAA preempted Montana law that required special disclosure of a
predispute arbitration clause as a condition to the enforceability of the agreement to arbitrate);
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987) (finding that the FAA preempted California law which
authorized former employee of securities brokerage firm to bring an action in court for wages
despite the existence of an agreement to arbitrate).
111. The Court reached this conclusion, in part, because of its concern that forum shopping
would develop if the rule were otherwise. Southland, 465 U.S. at 15.
112. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 838-39 (1995). Respondent and
twenty state attorneys general requested that Southland be overruled so that Alabama could
apply its own arbitration statute which prohibited arbitration of consumer claims. Id. at 839.
The Court declined to do so on the basis that nothing had changed in the ten years subsequent to
Southland to erode its authority, no unforeseen practical problems had arisen due to its applica-
tion, private parties had likely relied on it in drafting their arbitration agreements and Congress
had enacted legislation expanding, not restricting, the scope of arbitration under the FAA. Id.
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented and advocated that Southland be overruled. Id. at 844-51
(Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
Respondent's argument was reminiscent of the one advanced by Justice O'Connor in her dis-
sent (joined by Justice Rehnquist) in Southland. There, she stated that the majority decision to
require that state courts apply the FAA was "unquestionably wrong as a matter of statutory
construction." Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 24 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Although Jus-
tice O'Connor concurred with the decision in Dobson not to overrule Southland, she did so on
the basis of stare decisis. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. at 844 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She continued to
maintain, however, that Southland was wrongly decided, but acknowledged that it was not un-
workable and that Congress had not chosen to overrule it. Id.
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FAA. 113 The Court's willingness to strengthen the role of the FAA
and give effect to Congress' directive to enforce agreements to arbi-
trate, as demonstrated in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital and
Southland, strongly influenced the Court's decision to endorse SRO
arbitration.
B. History of the FAA's Impact on Securities Arbitration"14
1. Wilko v. Swan" 15
Wilko v. Swan has been characterized as "mark[ing] the beginning
of the modern era of securities arbitration" 6 and is the first reported
case addressing the arbitrability of claims alleging violations of the
federal securities laws." 7 There, the Court attempted to reconcile the
policy considerations behind the FAA with the policy considerations
behind the Securities Act."18 In Wilko, the Securities Act won the
upper hand, but its victory was shortlived; the Court overruled Wilko
thirty-five years later in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc.119
In Wilko, an investor signed a margin agreement 20 which contained
a clause requiring arbitration of any controversy under the rules of the
Arbitration Committee of the Chamber of Commerce, the AAA or
the NYSE. 1 1 A dispute arose concerning representations about a
merger made in connection with a stock purchase.122 The investor,
rather than arbitrating the matter, brought an action in federal district
court for violations of section 12(2) of the Securities Act, which,
113. Id. at 843.
114. The converse, "History of Securities Arbitration's Impact on the FAA," is equally valid.
Much of the law pursuant to the FAA has been developed and continues to be developed in the
context of securities arbitration clauses. See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S.
Ct. 1920 (1995) (indicating that the contract between parties determines who will decide the
issue of arbitrability); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995)
(noting that the securities arbitrator has power to award punitive damages).
115. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490
U.S. 477 (1989).
116. FLETCHER, supra note 91, at 36.
117. Id. at 35.
118. Id. The Securities Act, enacted a mere eight years after the FAA, does not address the
issue of whether parties can agree to arbitrate controversies arising under it. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
78u (1994).
119. 490 U.S. 477 (1989); see also infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text (discussing the
opinion in Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.).
120. A margin agreement deals with the rights and obligations of the parties when the cus-
tomer purchases securities on credit. The Exchange Act regulates the practice of buying securi-
ties on excessive credit. Exchange Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1994).
121. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 n.15 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
122. Id. at 429.
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among other things, permits the plaintiff to sue in either state or fed-
eral court.123 The issue before the Court was "whether an agreement
to arbitrate a future controversy is a 'condition, stipulation, or provi-
sion binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance
with any provision' of the Securities Act which section 14 [of the Act]
declares 'void."" 24
The Supreme Court held that the agreement to arbitrate was such a
stipulation waiving the right to select the judicial forum pursuant to
section 12(2).125 Because the Securities Act gives the investor a wider
choice of venue and courts, the investor, by agreeing to arbitrate,
gives up more than an ordinary participant in a commercial transac-
tion.126 The Court came to this conclusion despite the broad language
in the FAA that agreements to arbitrate future disputes are valid and
enforceable. 127
The Court, while recognizing that the provisions of the Securities
Act would apply in an arbitration, questioned the effectiveness of
their application in arbitration. 28 The Court distinguished the typical
commercial arbitration, where the "quality of a commodity or the
amount of money due under a contract" was at issue, from the arbitra-
tion of a securities dispute where the "subjective findings of the pur-
pose and knowledge of an alleged violator of the Act" must be
determined.' 29 The Court was further concerned with its ability to
ensure that the provisions of the Securities Act were followed inas-
much as arbitration decisions are made without judicial instruction on
the law in proceedings where no record is kept and by arbitrators
whose determinations, without explanation, are not easily vacated. 30
The dissent was much less suspicious of arbitration than was the
majority and much more willing to see the advantages of arbitra-
123. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994). The Supreme Court characterized section 12(2) as creating a
special right to recover for misrepresentation, different than that which existed at common law.
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431. Unlike the common law, section 12(2) places the burden of proving lack
of scienter on the seller of the securities, it permits the claim to be enforced in any state or
federal court, and if suit is brought in federal court, it gives the plaintiff a wide choice of venue,
the privilege of nationwide service of process and it dispenses with the jurisdictional dollar
amount requirement for diversity cases. Id.
124. Id. at 430. Section 14 of the Securities Act provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of
this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 77n
(1994).
125. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35.
126. Id. at 435.
127. Id. at 437.
128. Id. at 435-36.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 436.
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tion.131 Justices Frankfurter and Minton objected to the Court deny-
ing a litigant the advantages of arbitration, which "provid[es] a
speedier, more economical and effective enforcement of rights," ab-
sent a showing that the arbitral system "would not afford the [cus-
tomer] the rights to which he is entitled"'132 or that the customer had
"no choice" but to accept the arbitration stipulation, thereby render-
ing it an "unconscionable and unenforceable provision in a business
transaction."'1 33 As will be discussed, the dissent's position ultimately
prevailed. 13
Following Wilko, lower courts extended its prohibition to claims
brought pursuant to section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. 35 The
Supreme Court questioned the extension of Wilko to such claims
before it questioned Wilko itself. However, in the interim, the Court
decided a number of cases, both inside and outside of the securities
law context, that demonstrated both a willingness to permit arbitra-
tion of statutory claims, at least in the international context, and a
willingness to put teeth into Congress' directive that arbitration agree-
ments be treated and enforced like any other contract. 136
131. Id. at 439 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 439-40. The dissent specifically discussed the fact that under the rules of the AAA,
the parties could choose their arbitrators so that "those who are charged to enforce the rights are
selected by the parties themselves from among those qualified to decide." Id. at 439.
133. Id. at 440.
134. See infra notes 206-09 and accompanying text (discussing the opinion in Rodriquez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.).
135. See, e.g., Raiford v. Buslease, Inc., 745 F.2d 1419, 1421 (11th Cir. 1984); Mansbach v.
Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th Cir. 1979); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827-29 (10th Cir. 1978), overruled by Coffey v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 891 F.2d 261 (10th Cir. 1989); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 437-38 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977), superceded by statute as stated in Hays & Co. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 885 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1989); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. 538 F.2d 532, 536-37 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976),
overruling recognized by Kavouras v. Visual Prod. Sys., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985),
where the Court declined to address the issue of the extension of Wilko to Exchange Act claims,
there was uniformity among the circuits that Wilko applied to section 10(b) claims under the
Exchange Act. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 248-49 (1987) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). After Byrd, some courts, relying on the concurrence in Byrd, declined to
extend Wilko and found section 10(b) claims arbitrable. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 249 n.8.
Wilko was also extended to claims brought pursuant to other provisions of the Securities Act.
See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827 (10th Cir. 1978)
(extending Wilko to section 12(2)); Romyn v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 626,
630 (D. Utah 1986) (extending Wilko to sections 15 and 17(a)); Rockoff v. Shearson Lehman/
Am. Express, Inc., No. 85-2438-CIV-DAVIS, 1986 WL 2694, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 1986) (ex-
tending Wilko to sections 11 and 12(1)).
136. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (discussing the enactment of the FAA).
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2. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 137
In this 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court declined to extend Wilko to
bar arbitration of a section 10(b) claim under the Exchange Act when
the arbitration clause was contained in an agreement evidencing an
international transaction.138 In justification, the Court did not rely on
any differences between the Exchange Act and the Securities Act,
although it recognized that a "colorable argument" could be made
that such differences in the language and provisions of the two Acts
may require a contrary result.139 Rather, the Court relied on the dif-
ference between the transaction at issue in Scherk and the transaction
at issue in Wilko. The Court stressed the international nature of the
transaction in Scherk and found that difference to be "significant" and
"crucial," which raised concerns that did not exist in Wilko.140 For
example, in Wilko, there was no question that the law of the United
States would govern;14' in Scherk, there was considerable uncertainty
as to what law would apply.' 42 That uncertainty made the predispute
arbitration clause an "almost indispensable precondition to achieve-
ment of the orderliness and predictability essential to any interna-
tional business transaction.' 43 Thus, because the agreement
137. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
138. Id. Alberto-Culver, an American company, purchased various businesses and trade-
marks from Scherk, a German citizen. The companies purchased were organized under the laws
of Germany and Liechtenstein and were engaged in the manufacture and licensing of trade-
marks for toiletries. The negotiation and signing of the contract took place in Europe. The
closing took place in Geneva. When it learned that the trademarks it had purchased were en-
cumbered, Alberto-Culver commenced an action in a United States federal district court,
notwithstanding that the contract between the parties provided that any controversies or claims
would be referred to arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. Id. at
508-10.
139. Id. The Court discussed the fact that section 12(2) of the Securities Act, relied upon by
Wilko as providing an investor with a "special right" of a private remedy for civil liability, has no
statutory counterpart in the Exchange Act. It also acknowledged that even though both Acts
contain waiver provisions, the Securities Act prohibits waiver of the provision which permits a
plaintiff to bring suit in state or federal court while the Exchange Act provides for exclusive
jurisdiction in federal court. Id. at 513. As will be discussed, the Supreme Court did not rely on
these distinctions when it upheld arbitration of Exchange Act claims in McMahon. According to
the dissent in McMahon, the majority's decision to abandon the "colorable argument" as a basis
for distinguishing the result in Wilko relegated the argument to "its proper place in the grave-
yard of ideas." Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 245 n.2 (1987) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
140. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515.
141. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953).
142. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514.
143. Id. at 516. The Court was also concerned that, absent enforcement of the arbitration
clause, parties would attempt to gain tactical advantage by submitting a dispute to a forum hos-
tile to the interests of the other party. That result made the advantages of a wider choice of
courts and venue, deemed to be given up by the investor in Wilko, "chimerical since ... an
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containing the arbitration clause concerned the purchase of an inter-
national business, the provisions of the FAA could not be "ig-
nored"' and, consequently, Alberto-Culver could not "repudiate its
solemn promise"' 45 to arbitrate. 146
3. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd147
The Court's desire to enforce the requirements of the FAA, as
demonstrated in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital 48 and South-
land,149 had the paradoxical effect of causing a result in Byrd that ac-
tually promoted inefficiency. An investor brought an action in federal
court alleging violations of the Exchange Act and violations of various
state law provisions.150 The investor had signed a Customer Agree-
ment when he first opened his account which contained an arbitration
clause.' 51
The issue was whether a federal court could try both arbitrable and
nonarbitrable claims152 together if they were sufficiently factually and
legally "intertwined"' 53 or whether the court must bifurcate the
claims. 154 The Court held that bifurcation was mandated by the FAA,
"even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance
opposing party may by speedy resort to a foreign court block or hinder access to the American
court of the purchaser's choice." Id. at 518.
144. Id. at 513.
145. Id. at 519.
146. The dissent in Scherk, like the majority in Wilko, relied upon the antiwaiver provisions of
the Exchange Act to find the agreement to arbitrate void. Id. at 524 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The international nature of the transaction did not require a different result insofar as the Ex-
change Act's antiwaiver provision makes no distinction between domestic and international
agreements. Id. The dissent also reiterated the deficiencies with arbitration, as set forth in the
Wilko opinion, which presumably would also apply to the arbitration of a dispute arising under a
contract evidencing an international transaction. Id. at 532.
147. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
148. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text (discussing the strong federal policy in
favor of arbitration).
149. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text (discussing the federal preemption of state
law in arbitration).
150. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 214.
151. Id. at 215.
152. Id. at 215-16. Dean Witter apparently assumed that the Exchange Act claims were not
arbitrable under Wilko, and the majority in Byrd declined to address that issue because it was
not properly before the Court. Id. at 216 n.1.
153. The lower courts that relied on the doctrine of intertwining to try both arbitrable and
nonarbitrable claims together did so because it was believed necessary to preserve their exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the federal claims in the event the arbitration concluded first and the award
had preclusive effect and because it was more efficient by avoiding relitigation of the same is-
sues. Id. at 217.
154. The lower courts that required bifurcation did so on the basis that the FAA divested
them of any authority over arbitrable claims. Id. at 218-19.
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of separate proceedings in different forums. ' 155 In so holding, the
Court rejected the suggestion that the primary goal of the FAA was to
promote the expeditious resolution of claims.' 56 Rather, the foremost
purpose behind the passage of the FAA was to ensure judicial en-
forcement of privately made agreements to arbitrate: "The Act, after
all, does not mandate the arbitration of all claims, but merely the en-
forcement ... of privately negotiated arbitration agreements. '157
Justice White concurred. 158 While acknowledging that the issue of
the arbitrability of claims under the Exchange Act was not properly
before the Court, Justice White nevertheless stated that the extension
of Wilko to the Exchange Act was "a matter of substantial doubt."'1 59
He noted that the jurisdiction under the Exchange Act is more narrow
than that under the Securities Act and that the cause of action in
Wilko was express while the claim before the Court was implied under
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.160 While Justice White's view ulti-
mately prevailed, it was not for the reasons upon which he relied. 161
His concurrence, however, had the effect of calling into question the
whole line of lower court decisions extending Wilko to Exchange Act
claims.162 Thus, while the Byrd decision caused controversy, it was
not because of the majority's rigorous enforcement of the agreement
to arbitrate, but because of the dicta contained in Justice White's con-
curring opinion.
4. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.' 63
The decision in Mitsubishi was probably the best indication of how
the Supreme Court would rule when it squarely addressed the issue of
the arbitrability of claims brought pursuant to the Exchange Act.
Like the arbitration clause in Scherk, the arbitration clause in Mitsub-
ishi was contained in an agreement embodying an international trans-
action concerning the sale and distribution of automobiles. 164 After a
dispute arose between the parties, Mitsubishi brought an action
155. Id. at 217.
156. Id. at 219-21.
157. Id. at 219.
158. Id. at 224 (White, J., concurring).
159. Id. Justice White's concurrence echoes the Scherk Court's "colorable argument" dicta.
160. Id. at 224-25.
161. See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text (discussing the opinion in Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.).
162. See Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 248-49 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). Justice Blackmun criticized the Court for inappropriately keeping alive the issue of the
extension of Wilko to Exchange Act claims. Id. at 243, 248-49.
163. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
164. Id. at 617.
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against Soler in a United States federal court under the FAA and the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards seeking an order compelling arbitration in accordance with
the parties' agreement to arbitrate all disputes in accordance with the
rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Associa-
tion.165 Soler counterclaimed against Mitsubishi for, among other
things, violations of the Sherman Act.166
The Court first addressed the issue of whether an American court
could enforce an agreement to arbitrate when antitrust claims are
raised. The Court disagreed with Soler's contention that the arbitra-
tion clause, which did not expressly state that Sherman Act claims
were within its coverage, could not, as a matter of law, be interpreted
to encompass statutory claims. 167 The Court found no support in the
FAA for a presumption against the inclusion of statutory claims in
agreements to arbitrate.168
The Court then found that the arbitration agreement between the
parties did, in fact, include Soler's claim of violations of the Sherman
Act.169 The Court came to this conclusion by examining the intention
of the parties, 170 which, according to Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospi-
tal,'7' must be generously construed in favor of arbitration.172 The
Court declined to depart from Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
solely because claims founded on statutory rights were raised: "[W]e
are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of
arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the
development of arbitration as a means of dispute resolution.' 73
Thus, in construing an agreement to arbitrate, a court should not
pause as to the origin of the claims being asserted. Absent claims that
the agreement to arbitrate was procured by fraud or overwhelming
economic power, the "[FAA] itself provides no basis for disfavoring
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims by skewing the otherwise hos-
pitable inquiry into arbitrability.' 74
165. Id. at 618.
166. Id. at 619.
167. Id. at 626-27.
168. Id. at 625.
169. Id. at 629.
170. Id. at 625.
171. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (holding that any doubt concerning the scope
of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration).
172. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626.
173. Id. at 626-27.
174. Id.
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In support of its determination that the parties intended to arbitrate
the Sherman Act claims, the Court stressed that, by so agreeing, a
party does not give up the substantive rights granted by the Sherman
Act.175 Instead, all the party does is trade the "procedures and oppor-
tunity for review" of litigation in a judicial forum for the "simplicity,
informality and expedition of arbitration."' 76
The decision in Mitsubishi undoubtedly provided the foundation
needed by the Court to find Exchange Act claims arbitrable. The Mit-
subishi Court endorsed arbitration as an adequate method for the res-
olution of disputes, and it put statutory claims on the same footing as
common law claims, at least in the context of an international agree-
ment to arbitrate.
5. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon 177
The McMahon decision is an important one both for the arbitration
of securities law claims and for arbitration generally. 178 By enforcing
the predispute arbitration clause and permitting the arbitration of Ex-
change Act and RICO claims, "securities arbitration was basically
transformed from a voluntary procedure to a mandatory obliga-
tion"' 79 and the continued suspicion of arbitration was further under-
mined and denounced.1 80
The McMahons, customers of Shearson, filed suit in federal court
alleging violations of the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, claims based on RICO, and various
state law claims. 181 Because the McMahons had signed a Customer
175. Id. at 628. The Court's recognition that arbitration does not result in the loss of substan-
tive rights is particularly significant with respect to the analysis of the eligibility rule. See infra
notes 356-413 and accompanying text.
176. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628. After determining that the parties intended to
include Sherman Act claims within the arbitration provision, the Court next considered whether,
notwithstanding that agreement, the Sherman Act claims should not be arbitrated. In addressing
this issue, the Court, as it did in Scherk, discussed only the appropriateness of arbitration of the
Sherman Act claims in the international context. The Court found Scherk controlling and con-
cluded that, based on concerns of international comity and the need for predictability in the
international commercial system, the agreement to arbitrate should be enforced. Id. at 629-30.
177. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
178. The McMahon decision has been the subject of extensive commentary. See Shell, supra
note 36, at 397 n.3 (listing a number of citations to McMahon commentary); see also Hermann,
supra note 6, at 699 n.22 (same).
179. NYSE Symposium, supra note 12, at 1507 (panelist Professor Katsoris); see also Lewis D.
Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Securities Industry Arbitrations: An Examination and Analysis,
53 ALB. L. REv. 755, 757 (1989) (stating that, in practical effect, McMahon and Rodriguez de
Quijas established that most disputes in the securities industry will be resolved not in courts, but
through arbitration).
180. See McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
181. Id. at 223.
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Agreement which provided for arbitration of any controversy before
an SRO-administered arbitral forum, 182 Shearson moved to compel
arbitration pursuant to the FAA.' 83 The court of appeals, relying on
Wilko, although noting that Scherk and Byrd had cast doubt on its
applicability to Exchange Act claims, denied the motion with respect
to the Exchange Act and RICO claims. 184
In reversing, the Supreme Court first discussed the federal policy
favoring arbitration and, relying on Mitsubishi, indicated that its duty
to enforce agreements to arbitrate was not diminished when the claim
sought to be arbitrated involved a violation of a federal statute. 85 Af-
ter finding that the FAA itself required enforcement of an agreement
to arbitrate statutory claims, the Court next discussed whether Con-
gress had overridden the FAA's directive in the Exchange Act or in
RICO.' 86
The McMahons argued that the antiwaiver provision in the Ex-
change Act, like the antiwaiver provision in the Securities Act,
demonstrated a congressional intent that Exchange Act violations
should not be arbitrated but rather should have a judicial forum. 187
This time, the Court was not convinced. The Court, in distinguishing
Wilko, relied not on the purported differences between the antiwaiver
provisions of the two Acts, 188 but on what the Court characterized as
the Wilko Court's "general suspicion of the desirability of arbitration
and the competence of arbitral tribunals."' 89 Because the reasons
given by Wilko for questioning the adequacy of the arbitral forum had
been subsequently rejected by the Court, Wilko did not control and
could no longer be squared with the law as it had developed with re-
spect to arbitration generally.
Indeed, the Court rebuked each reason given by the Wilko Court
for distrusting the adequacy of the arbitral forum in handling Securi-
ties Act claims.' 90 The concern that difficult and subjective determi-
182. Id. The Customer Agreement provided for "arbitration in accordance with the rules,
then in effect, of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Board of Directors of
the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and/or the American Stock Exchange" as the customer may
elect. McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 482 U.S.
220 (1987).
183. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 223.
184. Id. at 224. With respect to the RICO claim, the court of appeals reasoned that because
RICO claims were not merely a private matter, arbitration of them would be inappropriate. Id.
185. Id. at 226.
186. Id. at 238.
187. Id. at 239.
188. Id. at 228; see supra note 139.
189. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 231.
190. Id.
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nations would be required of arbitrators without judicial reasoning
was rejected in Mitsubishi, where the Court recognized that arbitra-
tors were "readily capable of handling the factual and legal complexi-
ties of antitrust claims."' 191 The streamlined procedures of arbitration
were not found to entail any "consequential restrictions on substan-
tive rights,"'192 and the Court had also refused to assume that arbitra-
tors would not follow the law. 193
In further support of the Court's finding that the Wilko Court's sus-
picion of arbitration was no longer valid, the Court relied on the fact
that the SEC,194 pursuant to amendments to the Exchange Act en-
191. Id. at 232.
192. Id.
193. Id. The Court stated that the limited judicial review of arbitration awards was sufficient
to ensure that arbitrators follow the law. Id.; see supra note 99 (noting when an award may be
vacated).
194. The history of the SEC's position regarding the arbitrability of federal securities law
violations is interesting, to say the least. The SEC "shared [the] petitioner's burden" in Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 429 (1953), in arguing against the arbitrability of Securities Act violations
and stated in a Release that use of arbitration clauses without adequate disclosure of the availa-
bility of a judicial forum for violations of federal securities law was an inequitable and unjust
trade practice. Notice to Broker-Dealers Concerning Clauses in Customer Agreements which
Provide for Arbitration of Future Disputes, Exchange Act Release No. 15984 [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,125 (July 2, 1979). The SEC thereafter codified this posi-
tion in Rule 15c2-2 in 1983, in which it declared that failure to give adequate disclosure of the
availability of a judicial forum for violations of the federal securities laws constituted a fraudu-
lent, manipulative or deceptive act or practice. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1986) (rescinded).
The SEC dramatically changed its position when it endorsed arbitration of Exchange Act
claims in McMahon. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 261-62 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). There, the SEC alleged that its previous position against arbitration
was due solely to the Wilko decision and credited its authority over SRO rules as one of the
reasons for its change of heart. The dissent quite persuasively questioned the genuineness of the
SEC's purported change of heart. The dissent pointed out that the SEC, even before Wilko, had
consistently taken the position against the arbitrability of federal securities law claims, and that it
had also maintained that its regulatory authority over SRO rules could not ensure the adequacy
of SRO arbitration. Id. at 262 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The SEC's change in position may have been political (the Reagan administration's general
policy of deregulation, the congressional endorsement of arbitration in the Commodity Ex-
change Act), practical (the growing realization by the SEC that arbitration has advantages for
investors) or expedient (the SEC may have anticipated the result and preferred not to lose an-
other battle with the Court). Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 179, at 764. Whatever the
reason, the SEC's endorsement of SRO arbitration for Exchange Act claims undoubtedly played
a role in the Court's decision. After the McMahon decision, the SEC rescinded Rule 15c2-2.
Rescission of Rule Governing Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses in Broker-Dealer Cus-
tomer Agreements, Exchange Act Release 25034 [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,163 (Oct. 21, 1987).
In the much awaited decision in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct.
1212 (1995), regarding the availability of punitive damages in SRO arbitration, the SEC's posi-
tion seemed to have played an essential role in the Court's decision. The Mastrobuono Court,
finding that arbitrators could indeed award punitive damages, did not rely on the reasoning or
arguments advanced by either party in the action, but rather upon the reasoning set forth by the
SEC. Id. at 1218. The Court's reliance on the SEC demonstrates that it "helps to have powerful
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acted after Wilko, 95 gained authority over the rules of the SROs.
That authority, the Court found, gave the SEC "expansive power to
ensure the adequacy of the arbitration procedures employed by the
SROs,"'1 96 and because the SEC had approved the procedures of the
three SRO forums listed in the Customer Agreement, the Court held
that an arbitration agreement "does not effect a waiver of the protec-
tions of the Act."'1 97 Thus, in the process of enforcing the predispute
agreement to arbitrate Exchange Act claims, the McMahon Court
also legitimized SRO arbitration. 98
The dissent' 99 took issue with the majority's uncritical acceptance of
arbitration and its disregard of the problems identified with it by the
Wilko Court.200 While acknowledging that there had been an im-
provement in the procedures applicable in securities arbitrations, 201
the dissent did not believe that such improvements changed arbitra-
tion so significantly as to eliminate the Wilko Court's concerns with
friends when you are before the Supreme Court." C. Evan Stewart, No Longer Simple, Quick,
Informal or Inexpensive, N.Y. L.J., June 15, 1995, at 5.
195. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (noting that Congress amended the Exchange
Act to grant the SEC the power to amend the rules of the SROs). The dissent pointed out that
Congress in those amendments did not attempt to overrule Wilko. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 247
(Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
196. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233.
197. Id. at 234. Although it is not entirely free from doubt, the tenor of the opinion suggests
that the Court would have come to the same conclusion even if the SEC did not have regulatory
control over the rules of the SROs. The SEC's additional regulatory authority seems to have
been a justification for avoiding the doctrine of stare decisis: "While stare decisis concerns may
counsel against upsetting Wilko's contrary conclusion under the Securities Act, we refuse to
extend Wilko's reasoning to the Exchange Act in light of these intervening regulatory develop-
ments." Id.
198. The Court's endorsement of the adequacy of SRO arbitration also led it to find that the
RICO claims were arbitrable. Id. at 240. Because there was nothing in the text or the legislative
history of RICO indicating congressional intent to exempt claims based on RICO from the re-
quirements of the FAA, the Court considered whether arbitration of RICO claims irreconcilably
conflicted with the principles underlying RICO. Id. The Court found no conflict inasmuch as
the investors "effectively may vindicate [their RICO claims] in the arbitral forum." Id.
199. Id. at 242 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). Justices Blackmun, Brennan and
Marshall dissented as to the arbitrability of the Exchange Act claims. Justice Stevens, writing
separately, also dissented on the same basis. He asserted that the longlasting interpretation of
Wilko's applicability to Exchange Act claims created a strong presumption that any mistake that
the Court may have made in interpreting the statute should be remedied not by the judiciary, but
by Congress. Id. at 268-69 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
200. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 250 (1987) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring and dissenting). The dissent was also not convinced that the SEC's oversight of SRO
rules was enough to ensure that SRO arbitration was adequate inasmuch as the SEC's authority
extended only to a general review of SRO rules and did not include the authority to police or
monitor the results of arbitration for the misapplication of the law or for the fairness of the
proceedings. Id. at 265.
201. The dissent specifically noted the development of the UCA. Id. at 257-58.
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it.20 2 Ultimately, the dissent concluded that a congressional policy was
needed to alter the special position the customer was granted in the
Exchange Act.203
6. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 204
Although the McMahon dissent asserted that the majority's deci-
sion effectively overruled Wilko,20 5 it was not officially overruled until
two years later in Rodriguez de Quijas. In the 5-4 decision, the Court
found that, once it put aside "the outmoded presumption of disfavor-
ing arbitration proceedings, ' 20 6 the special rights granted by the Se-
curities Act with respect to choice of forum and wider venue selection
could indeed be dispensed with by an arbitration agreement without
contravening the Securities Act.20 7 The special rights described in
Wilko were characterized as "procedural" and, as such, were not cov-
ered by the antiwaiver provision of the Securities Act.20 8
Thus, the Court further endorsed arbitration for the resolution of
securities law disputes and continued to effectuate the objective of the
FAA. With the overruling of Wilko, there were no longer any restric-
tions, except those restrictions provided in the FAA itself,209 to the
arbitration of securities law claims.
202. Id. at 259. The dissent gave a few examples of the problems with SRO arbitration that
still existed: the lack of a record of proceedings; the fact that arbitrators were not bound by
precedent and were discouraged from giving reasons for their decisions; and the very limited
judicial review of such decisions. Id.
203. Id. at 260. The dissent expressed particular concern with the position that the investor is
relegated to in the arbitral forum. It noted that securities arbitrations take place in forums con-
trolled by the securities industry, which gives the broker-dealer a decided advantage over the
investor. Id. at 260-61.
204. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
205. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 243 (1987) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
206. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989). The Court cited
McMahon, Scherk, Mitsubishi, Byrd and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital as evidence of the
erosion of the hostile judicial attitude against arbitration that pervaded the Wilko decision. Id.
at 480-81.
207. Id. at 481-82.
208. Id. at 482. The Court stated: "To the extent that Wilko rested on suspicion of arbitration
as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complain-
ants, it has fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes
favoring this method of resolving disputes." Id. at 481.
209. The FAA provides that a predispute arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Indeed, the Rodriguez de Quijas Court indicated that if the party
opposing arbitration presents well-supported allegations that the arbitration agreement resulted
from fraud or overwhelming economic power, then grounds for the revocation of the agreement
would exist under the FAA. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 483-84 (citing Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)).
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IV. THE ELIGIBILITY RULE
The Supreme Court's endorsement of SRO arbitration was based
on the presumption that SRO arbitration does not result in the loss of
substantive rights.210 An agreement to arbitrate was characterized as
a "specialized kind of forum-selection clause, '21' where the party does
not forgo substantive rights, but merely "trades the procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality
and expedition of arbitration. 2 12 The Court came to that conclusion,
however, without examining the specific procedures applicable in
SRO arbitral forums.213
The eligibility rule, applicable in SRO arbitration, seemingly con-
trary to the foregoing federal law, results in the loss of a substantive
right.21 4 The rule has been interpreted by the securities industry and
by the judiciary to bar an investor from bringing, in either an arbitral
or judicial forum, a claim, otherwise timely pursuant to the statute of
limitations when, pursuant to the eligibility rule, six years have
elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the claim.215 If the
securities industry and the lower federal courts are correct in this
view, then the enforceability of predispute arbitration clauses requir-
ing arbitration before an SRO forum must be revisited, for such a re-
sult has the effect of forcing investors to unknowingly relinquish an
210. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481; Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 229 (1987). A member of the securities industry recollected as follows:
The way arbitration was sold to both the Supreme Court and the SEC was that essen-
tially you have the same rights in arbitration as you would have in court. We're not
going to use arbitration to limit the right to recoup damages. We're not going to use
arbitration to limit statutes of limitations.
NYSE Symposium, supra note 12, at 1523 (panelist Mr. Page).
211. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 483 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506, 519 (1974)).
212. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628. It is questionable today whether an investor
who agrees to arbitrate is actually getting the benefit of the bargain. Criticism is mounting that
securities arbitration is no longer informal or expeditious. See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra
note 43, at 87,433 ("[t]he increasingly litigious nature of securities arbitration has gradually
eroded the advantages of SRO arbitration."); Stewart, supra note 194, at 5; Susan Antilla, Wall
Street, The Next Magic Bullet? Mediation, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 1995, § 3, at 3; Bill Barnhart, Few
Satisfied with Securities Arbitration, Cin. TRI., Aug. 22, 1994, § 3 (Business); Jay Matthews,
Arbitration Cases Grow in Number and Complexity, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1994, at HO.
213. The Supreme Court has consistently maintained that while the FAA requires the en-
forcement of agreements to arbitrate it does not prescribe the procedures that are to govern in
the arbitral forum. See, e.g., Volt Info. Sys. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 469 (1988)
("There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the
federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agree-
ments to arbitrate.").
214. See infra part IV.B.2.
215. See infra notes 356-413 and accompanying text (discussing the loss of substantive rights in
the analysis of the eligibility rule).
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essential substantive right. Investors trade-off many of the procedural
protections of the judicial forum for the expedition and informality of
arbitration. That trade-off should not include the right to bring the
timely claim itself.
A. The Eligibility Rule and Its Origins
The NASD Eligibility Rule provides as follows:
Time Limitation on Submission
Sec. 15.
No dispute, claim, or controversy shall be eligible for submission to
arbitration under this Code where six (6) years have elapsed from
the occurrence or event giving rise to the act or dispute, claim, or
controversy. This section shall not extend applicable statutes of lim-
itations, nor shall it apply to any case which is directed to arbitration
by a court of competent jurisdiction.2 16
The rule was adopted almost verbatim from the UCA's eligibility
rule, as amended in 1984.217 According to Professor Katsoris, an orig-
inal public member of SICA, the rule was included in the UCA as a
matter of convenience to prevent stale claims from going to arbitra-
tion.2 18 Six years was chosen as the period because it "dovetailed" the
SEC's books and record-keeping retention requirement. 219
The requirements of the rule are clear. A claim may be submitted
for arbitration as long as six years have not elapsed from the date of
the occurrence or event giving rise to the claim, which is usually
deemed the date the securities were purchased. 220 The effect of the
rule on an investor's claim is also clear. An investor may have a claim
that is eligible for arbitration because it was submitted within six years
216. NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE, § 15 (Mar. 1995). The NASD rule is
quoted because the NASD handles 85% of all SRO arbitration claims. Task Force Report, supra
note 43, at 87,433.
217. Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, Fourth Report of the Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration 4 (Nov. 1984). Neither the NASD, nor any other SRO, has adopted
the UCA's most recent changes to the eligibility rule. See infra note 419.
Although the current NASD six-year eligibility rule was adopted from the UCA, the original
NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure contained a two-year time limitation, which was in-
creased to five years in 1977. NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE (Jan. 1977).
218. NYSE Symposium, supra note 12, at 1533; see also Task Force Report, supra note 43, at
87,434.
219. NYSE Symposium, supra note 12, at 1544 (panelist Deborah Masucci). It has been sug-
gested that one of the original reasons for the imposition of the eligibility rule was document
availability and that that reason should no longer be a consideration in view of the increased
efficiency in document handling by securities firms. Securities firms, by using microfiche, micro-
film and computers, are now able to retain and easily access documents they could not have
retained in the late 1970s. Id. at 1548 (panelist Mr. Beckley); see also Task Force Report, supra
note 43, at 87,445.
220. See Task Force Report, supra note 43, at 87,441.
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from the date of the occurrence or event giving rise to it, but the claim
is nonetheless untimely because the statute of limitations applicable to
the claim is shorter than the six-year period. Conversely, an investor
may have a claim that is timely within the applicable statute of limita-
tions, but is barred from arbitration because it was submitted more
than six years from the date of the occurrence or event giving rise to
the claim.
While there are few claims that have a statute of limitations actually
longer than six years, accrual and discovery rules, held inapplicable to
the SRO eligibility rule, 221 may extend the time within which to bring
the claim.222 For example, a uniform four-year limitation period is
applied to a civil RICO claim. 223 In the Second Circuit, a RICO claim
accrues every time the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered
a new injury caused by the predicate RICO violation.224 In New
York,225 the six-year statute of limitations applicable to causes of ac-
tion based on breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty22 6 does
not begin to accrue until damages occur, i.e., when losses are in-
curred.227 For a fraud cause of action, the statute of limitations is the
longer of six years from the time the cause of action accrued or two
years from discovery of the fraud.228 As these examples demonstrate,
it is entirely possible for an investor to be in the position of having a
claim deemed timely pursuant to a state or federal limitations period,
but untimely pursuant to the SRO eligibility rule. Unfortunately, if
the investor signed an agreement which contained an arbitration
clause, the investor may lose his or her claim entirely.229
This situation is unlikely to develop, however, with respect to claims
based on violations of the federal securities laws due to their rather
short statutes of limitations and the fact that tolling principles are in-
221. See infra note 285.
222. Id.
223. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 148 (1987).
224. Bingham v. Zolt, 66 F.3d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Steinberg v. Bingham, 116
S. Ct. 1418 (1996). Because the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of when a cause of
action accrues under RICO, a split has developed among the circuits. A civil RICO action has
been held to accrue upon, inter alia, the commission of the last predicate act, the discovery of the
last predicate act, or the plaintiff's discovery of his or her injuries. Id.
225. New York law is used because most customer agreements specify New York as the par-
ties' choice of law to govern the dispute. Seth E. Lipner & Herbert M. Deutsch, The Statute of
Limitations and Securities Arbitration: Law, Practice and Procedure, at 5 (PLI Corp. Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 819, July-Aug. 1993).
226. These are common claims in securities arbitrations. Id. at 6-7.
227. Id. at 10.
228. Id.
229. See infra note 356 and accompanying text (discussing the majority approach to the conse-
quences of a finding of ineligibility).
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applicable.2 30 For example, a claim based on a violation of an implied
cause of action pursuant to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Ex-
change Act must be commenced within one year after discovery of the
facts constituting the violation and within three years after such viola-
tion.231 The same holds true for violations of sections 11 and 12(2) of
the Securities Act.232 The fact that an investor is not likely to be in
the position of relinquishing a timely federal securities claim because
of the SRO eligibility rule and is more likely to be in that position with
respect to other federal claims or state common law claims should not
immunize the eligibility rule from review for its fairness and legality.
Although the Supreme Court was discussing rights derived from fed-
eral statutory law when it held that arbitration does not result in the
loss of substantive rights, there is no principled reason to limit that
statement to exclude rights derived from state common law. The ori-
gin of the rights asserted should be immaterial to the question of
whether an investor, by agreeing to arbitrate a future controversy, has
unknowingly given up a timely cause of action. 233
Although the eligibility rule was part of the original UCA,2 3 4 the
rule did not receive much attention until the early 1990s when arbitra-
tion over investments in limited partnership cases became signifi-
cant.2 35 The monthly statements issued by brokers for customers with
investments in limited partnerships typically used the original
purchase price as the current value of the partnership. 236 Thus, any
230. The restrictive limitations periods applicable to securities law violations result in many
investors forgoing their federal securities claims. Lipner & Deutsch, supra note 225, at 7.
Although tolling is not permitted, some courts have applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to
extend the time period applicable for violations of the federal securities laws. Emil Bukhman,
Time Limitations on Arbitrability of Securities Industry Disputes Under the Arbitration Rules of
Self-Regulatory Organizations, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 143, 158-59 (1995) [hereinafter Bukhman,
Time Limitations on Arbitrability]. See generally Lewis D. Lowenfuss & Alan R. Bromberg,
SEC Rule lOb-5 and Its New Statute of Limitations: The Circuits Defy the Supreme Court, 51
Bus. LAw 309 (1996).
231. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 350 (1991).
232. Securities Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. §77m (1994).
233. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 621-22
(1985) (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 2 (1984), and construing an arbitration
clause to encompass the dispute at issue without pausing at the source in a state statute of the
rights asserted by the party).
234. Second Report, supra note 73, at A-4.
235. Peter Blackman, Brokerage Firms Seek to Derail Arbitration Effort, N.Y. L.J. Mar. 3,
1994, at 5.
The NASD, for example, has seen a tremendous increase in the number of motions directed to
it based on the eligibility rule. Prior to 1990, the NASD received less than twenty such motions
per year. In 1993, that number increased to 600. 470 motions were filed in 1994. These figures
do not include the motions that are made directly to court. NYSE Symposium, supra note 12, at
1545 (panelist Deborah Masucci).
236. Blackman, supra note 235, at 5.
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decrease in the value of the investment was not timely disclosed.237 In
1991, the North American State Securities Administrators238 ruled
that this valuing practice used by brokers was fraudulent and man-
dated that brokers disclose the decrease, if any, in the value of the
limited partnership.2 39 When brokers began properly valuing the
partnership interests, many customers learned for the first time that
their brokers had purchased unsuitable investments for them or had
misled them as to the value of their investment.240 Lawsuits began
and, because many investors had signed predispute arbitration agree-
ments, much of that litigation was submitted to SRO arbitral forums.
However, much time had passed between the date of the original in-
vestment and the date of the submission of the claim to arbitration. It
was in this context that the eligibility rule started to play a role that
appears not to have been intended by those who drafted it.241
The fact that brokers are now honestly valuing an investor's interest
in a limited partnership does not mean that the role of the eligibility
rule will be diminished. Indeed, the eligibility rule may play even a
greater role because securities firms are now selling financial products
whose value cannot be determined for many years.242 Unless the
SROs eliminate the eligibility rule or the courts change their interpre-
tation of it, persons investing in these new products may find that by
signing the predispute arbitration clause, they have, in essence, agreed
not to sue their broker for any misconduct.
B. Interpretation of the Eligibility Rule
Many issues have arisen with respect to the eligibility rule.243 This
article focuses on two issues in detail: who should determine whether
237. Id.
238. The NASSA is a group of state securities regulators. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text (discussing the original purpose of the
eligibility rule and SICA's intent to permit litigation of ineligible claims in a judicial forum).
242. NYSE Symposium, supra note 12, at 1535 (panelist Seth Lipner) ("There are CMOs
based on variable rates and tied to the daily LIBOR that are thirty years out there that cannot
be priced."); see also Task Force Report, supra note 43, at 87,440 (stating that eligibility rule
issues will not abate with the diminution of the numbers of disputes involving limited
partnerships).
243. The eligibility rule has generated "extensive collateral litigation" which has "contributed
to erosion of investor confidence in SRO sponsored arbitration." Task Force Report, supra note
43, at 87,434.
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a claim is eligible and what the consequence should be to the investor
whose claim is found ineligible.244
1. Who Should Decide Whether a Claim Is Eligible Under
SRO Rules
The identity of the decision-maker on timeliness issues may have a
significant impact on the conclusions reached. It is generally believed
that arbitrators, unlike judges, are not bound to follow strictly the law
but, rather, may base their decisions on what is "fair, just or sensible
under the circumstances. ' 245 Accordingly, one would expect that the
party (usually the investor) whose claim is challenged as untimely
would fare better if an arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, and not a
judge, determines the eligibility issue.
Until the courts began examining the so-called eligibility rule, the
law appeared relatively straightforward that, pursuant to the FAA, the
arbitrator and not the court decides whether a claim is time-barred.
246
This rule was based on the very limited role courts play in determining
arbitrability.
In AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of
America,247 the Supreme Court held that, because an agreement to
arbitrate is a matter of contract and a party may only be compelled to
arbitrate an issue he or she has previously agreed to arbitrate, the
court, rather than the arbitrator, unless the agreement clearly and un-
mistakenly provides otherwise, should decide if the parties intended
to include a particular dispute within the scope of their arbitration
agreement.2" That is the extent of the court's role; the court is not
244. The question of when the six-year time period begins to run and whether it may be tolled
is discussed, but only in the context of analyzing a particular court's determination of the eligibil-
ity issue.
245. Wallace, supra note 6, at 1248; see also Shell, supra note 36, at 421 (although law appears
to play some role in arbitration, it "does not enjoy the official status in arbitration that it does in
court").
246. See, e.g., Local 285, Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. Nonotuck Resource Assocs., Inc., 64
F.3d 735, 740 (1st Cir. 1995); Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. Washington
Post, 959 F.2d 288, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d
114, 121 (2d Cir. 1991); General Promotional Employees of Affiliated Indus., Local Union No.
744 v. Metropolitan Distrib., Inc., 763 F.2d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 1985); Nursing Home & Hosp.
Union No. 434 v. Sky Vue Terrace, Inc., 759 F.2d 1094, 1097 (3d Cir. 1985); County of Durham v.
Richards & Assocs., 742 F.2d 811, 815 (4th Cir. 1984); Commerce Park at DPW Freeport v.
Mardian Const. Co., 729 F.2d 334, 339 (5th Cir. 1984); Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 693 F.2d 1023, 1028 (11th Cir. 1982); O'Neel v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 667
F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1982).
247. 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
248. Id. at 648-49. In making that determination, there is a presumption of arbitrability. Id.
at 650; see also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1924 (1995) (holding
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permitted to rule on the merits of the underlying controversy. 249
Once it is determined that the parties intended to submit the subject
matter of the dispute to arbitration, the arbitrator, and not the court,
then determines all "procedural questions which grow out of the dis-
pute and bear on its final disposition. '250
In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,251 an issue arose as to
whether the court or the arbitrator should determine whether a union
abandoned its grievance by its failure to comply with a contractual
provision requiring that notice of any grievance be filed with the
Union Shop Steward within four weeks after the event's occurrence or
latest existence.252 The Court held that the issue of timeliness was for
the arbitrator.253 Thus, a distinction was drawn that the court deter-
mines "substantive arbitrability" issues while the arbitrators deter-
mine "procedural arbitrability" issues.254 The Supreme Court left
procedural issues to the arbitrator because the issues are often inter-
twined with the merits of the dispute, and, if reserved for the courts,
could produce duplication of effort and an opportunity for deliberate
delay. 255
Most courts deemed the issue of whether a claim was filed timely to
be a procedural one, subject to the arbitrator's jurisdiction. 256 This
was so regardless of whether the time bar was based on a contractual
provision,257 an SRO arbitral forum procedural rule,258 or a state stat-
ute of limitations.259 As the First Circuit recently stated: "Thirty
that the presumption is reversed if the contract is silent or ambiguous as to whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate the arbitrability issue).
249. AT&T Tech., Inc., 475 U.S. at 649-50.
250. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964).
251. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
252. Id. at 544.
253. Id.
254. See, e.g., Automotive, Petroleum & Allied Indus. Employees Union v. Town & Country
Ford, Inc., 709 F.2d 509, 510 (8th Cir. 1983).
255. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 376 U.S. at 558; see also Town & Country Ford, Inc., 709 F.2d at
511.
256. See, e.g., County of Durham v. Richards & Assocs., 742 F.2d 811, 815 (4th Cir. 1984).
257. See, e.g., id. (stating that an agreement to arbitrate incorporated a two-year statute of
limitations and that the issue of timeliness of arbitration is up to the arbitrator); Town & Country
Ford, Inc., 709 F.2d at 512 (discussing whether grievance timely filed under contract provision
was issue for arbitrators); Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023, 1028
(8th Cir. 1982) (finding that arbitrator should decide the issue of whether party complied with
contract provision requiring notice of intent to arbitrate within one year after accrual of cause of
action).
258. O'Neel v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 667 F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding
that it is up to the arbitrator to determine whether arbitration is timely where code of arbitration
contained a five-year time limit on submission).
259. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that
"any limitations defense-whether stemming from the arbitration agreement, arbitration associ-
1996]ELIGIBILITY RULE IN SECURITIES ARBITRATION 147
years of Supreme Court and federal circuit precedent have established
that issues concerning the timeliness of a filed grievance are 'classic'
procedural questions to be decided by an arbitrator ... .260
Although the case law appeared settled that issues of timeliness are
issues that should be addressed by the arbitrator, a split has developed
in the circuits regarding the application of that law to the eligibility
rule.261 The Seventh Circuit first addressed the issue, although not
extensively, in PaineWebber, Inc. v. Farnam.2 62 There, the brokerage
firm sought a declaration that it need not engage in an arbitration
brought by a former customer due to the untimeliness of the submis-
sion pursuant to NASD Code section 15.263 The court itself deter-
mined that the claim was barred by section 15 after finding that the
NASD considered section 15 to be an eligibility requirement, 264 not a
statute of limitations, and that it acted as an absolute bar to claims
submitted more than six years after the event that gave rise to
ation rule, or state statute-is an issue to be addressed by the arbitrators"); see Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Shaddock, 822 F. Supp. 125,131 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Louis Dreyfus Corp.
v. Cook Indus., Inc., 505 F. Supp. 4, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
260. Local 285, Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. Nonotuck Resource Assocs., Inc., 64 F.3d 735,
739 (1st Cir. 1995).
261. The eligibility rule is silent as to who shall make the determination regarding eligibility.
See supra note 216.
262. 870 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1989)
263. Here, and in the cases that follow, it was the brokerage firm that sought to avoid arbitra-
tion. It is indeed ironic that it is the brokerage firms that condition doing business with them on
the customer's execution of an agreement to arbitrate future disputes that prefer a judicial forum
for timeliness defenses. The reason seems clear: if the issue of eligibility were to go to the
arbitrator rather than the court, the arbitrator could base his or her determination on the equi-
ties of the situation rather than on technical compliance with the eligibility rule. The unrelenting
attempts by the securities firms to get the eligibility issue before the court is thus a transparent
attempt to control the ultimate outcome of the issue. A Florida District Court of Appeals
openly criticized a securities firm's obvious change of heart concerning the appropriateness of
arbitration for investor disputes:
For its own purposes, Dean Witter chose to draft customer agreements requiring cus-
tomers to submit to arbitration "any controversy." It is not surprising that, in circum-
stances like those presented in this case, Dean Witter would prefer the procedural and
substantive advantages of a judicial forum for the prompt and dispassionate application
of such legal defenses as the statute of limitations. But Dean Witter elected a different,
nonjudicial forum for resolution of "any controversy" with its customers. Having pro-
vided for arbitration in its customer agreement, Dean Witter will have to trust the arbi-
trators to do their jobs properly.
Victor v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 606 So. 2d 681, 686 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
264. Farnam, 870 F.2d at 1292. The Court relied on a letter from an NASD staff attorney
which stated: "In other words, the NASD will not process a claim that falls wholly outside the
six year period." Id. That statement does not indicate who should decide whether the claim is
eligible. A fair reading suggests that the NASD itself would make that determination. Indeed,
absent court litigation, the NASD Director of Arbitration currently decides eligibility issues if
they are clear cut. If not clear cut, the issues go to the arbitrator. Task Force Report, supra note
43, at 87,441.
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them.265 Although the court did not explicitly state that the eligibility
rule was a substantive limitation on the arbitrator's jurisdiction, it re-
lied on a New York Court of Appeals case,266 which made a distinc-
tion between conditions precedent to arbitration, which the court
determines, and procedural stipulations imposed by the parties to gov-
ern the conduct of the proceeding, which the arbitrator decides.267 In-
asmuch as New York law had consistently held that issues of
timeliness are subject to the court's jurisdiction,268 it is fair to assume
that the court found the eligibility rule to be a condition precedent to
arbitration and not a procedural stipulation.269
The following year, the Third Circuit, in PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hart-
mann,270 analyzed NYSE Rule 603, the eligibility rule contained in the
NYSE Code of Arbitration,271 within the context of the FAA. The
Third Circuit reached the same result that the Seventh Circuit reached
in Farnam.272 Because the eligibility issue arose in the context of a
motion to compel arbitration pursuant to section 4 of the FAA,2 7 3 the
265. Farnam, 870 F.2d at 1292. The consequence to investors of the court's finding that sec-
tion 15 is not a statute of limitations is astounding. In a later case, Edward D. Jones & Co. v.
Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1992), the court held that because the eligibility rule is not a
statute of limitation, a claim that a broker-dealer fraudulently concealed his conduct cannot
"toll" the six-year period, which commenced on the date of the transaction. Id. at 513. This
result, of course, rewards the broker-dealer who can successfully conceal his or her wrongdoing.
Even if one were to agree with the court that the eligibility rule is not a statute of limitations
subject to tolling, that alone should not preclude the court from commencing the running of the
six-year period from the date the customer discovered or should have discovered the miscon-
duct. While this may be solely a matter of semantics, the result is needed to prevent broker-
dealers from profiting from their fraudulent conduct.
266. The court relied on In re Arbitration between the County of Rockland and Primiano
Construction Co., 51 N.Y.2d 1 (1980), presumably because the contract provided that New York
law would apply. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Farnam, 870 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 1989).
The court's reliance on New York law is today questionable in view of Mastrobuono v. Shear-
son Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995), where the court held that a choice-of-law
clause in an arbitration agreement does not necessarily include the state's rules applicable to
arbitration.
267. In re Arbitration between the County of Rockland and Primiano Const. Co., 51 N.Y.2d
at 8.
268. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 7502(b) (McKinney 1996); see also Smith Barney, Harris
Upham & Co., Inc. v. Luckie, 85 N.Y.2d 193 (1995); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. DeChaine, 194 A.D.2d 472 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
269. The Seventh Circuit upheld the result reached in Farnam three years later in Edward D.
Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 1992), and declined to revisit it more recently
in Smith Barney Inc. v. Schell, 53 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 1995).
270. 921 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1990).
271. NYSE Rule 603 is identical to NASD section 15.
272. Hartmann, 921 F.2d at 514; see also PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372 (3d
Cir. 1993).
273. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the court's power to compel arbitra-
tion pursuant to the FAA).
1996]ELIGIBILITY RULE IN SECURITIES ARBITRATION 149
court indicated that before it could grant the motion, it must engage in
a limited review to ensure that the agreement to arbitrate was valid
and that the specific dispute fell within the substantive scope of the
agreement.274 With respect to the issue of whether the parties' dis-
pute fell within the arbitration agreement, 275 the court recognized that
under AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of
America,2 76 it must operate under a presumption of arbitrability un-
less it could be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause
was not susceptible of an interpretation that covered the asserted dis-
pute.277 The issue thus came down to the question of the scope of the
agreement to arbitrate and whether Rule 603 had an impact on that
scope.2 78
PaineWebber argued that Rule 603 was intended to prevent
PaineWebber from being forced to arbitrate a dispute that arose after
the agreement to arbitrate had expired.279 In other words, PaineWeb-
ber argued that it agreed to arbitrate only those disputes falling within
the six-year time period.28 0 The scope of the agreement was therefore
limited to timely claims.281 The Hartmanns, on the other hand, re-
sponded that Rule 603 was not intended as a substantive limitation on
the agreement to arbitrate, but rather as a procedural requirement
governing the initiation of disputes that had already fallen within the
substantive limits of the agreement to arbitrate.282 The Hartmanns
relied on, among other things, the case law finding that timeliness
claims were procedural issues that should be decided by the arbitra-
tor.2 83 The court, while finding the Hartmanns' interpretation of Rule
603 to be "quite plausible," nonetheless agreed with PaineWebber and
determined that Rule 603 supported PaineWebber's argument that the
274. Hartmann, 921 F.2d at 511. The court did not analyze whether the parties had by con-
tract agreed to permit the arbitrator to determine the scope of their agreement to arbitrate. Id.
at 514. Rather, the court found, as a logical corollary to the policy that a party cannot be com-
pelled to arbitrate any dispute which he or she has not agreed to arbitrate, that a party cannot be
required to arbitrate the threshold "dispute" of whether the underlying dispute is itself arbitra-
ble. Id. The court, of course, should have reviewed the arbitration agreement to determine if
the parties had included a provision setting forth who would determine issues of arbitrability.
See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).
275. There was no dispute as to the validity of the agreement to arbitrate. Hartmann, 921
F.2d at 514.
276. 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
277. Hartmann, 921 F.2d. at 511.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 511-12.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 512.
283. Id.
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parties intended to bar arbitration of disputes that fell outside the
time requirements of the eligibility rule.2 84 In other words, the eligi-
bility rule was a substantive limitation on the jurisdiction of the arbi-
tral forum.2 85 The court relied on an expanded reading of Rule 603,
the fact that the Farnam court, the only other circuit court to address
the issue, came to the same conclusion, and the fact that the language
of Rule 603 stood in stark contrast to the language at issue in the cases
relied upon by the Hartmanns. 86
The court's rationale is flawed for a number of reasons. First, by
relying on its expanded reading of the plain language of the rule,287
the court ignores the actual purpose and effect of the rule. The pur-
pose was to keep stale claims out of arbitration.2 88 Thus, Rule 603 has
the same purpose as a statute of limitations.289 The effect of Rule 603
is to bar from arbitration claims instituted more than six years from
284. Id.
285. Id. at 513. Other courts have reached the same result. See, e.g., Cogswell v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78 F.3d 474 (10th Cir. 1996); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381 (11th Cir. 1995); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, 995
F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1993); Roney & Co. v. Kassab, 981 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1992); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Barchman, 916 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. 11. 1996); John Hancock
Distribs., Inc. v. Saponaro, 901 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Pa. 1995); A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v.
Clark, 894 F. Supp. 320 (W.D. Mich. 1995); Manasse v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 892 F. Supp. 696
(W.D. Pa. 1995); Ohio Co. v. Nemecek, 886 F. Supp. 1342 (E.D. Mich. 1995); PaineWebber, Inc.
v. Richardson, 94 Civ. 3104 (AGS), 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5317 (S.D.N.Y. April 21, 1995); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, v. Masland, 878 F. Supp. 710 (M.D. Pa. 1995); Mutual Serv.
Corp. v. Spaulding, 871 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. III. 1994); Davis v. Keyes, 859 F. Supp. 290 (E.D.
Mich. 1994); Prudential Sec. v. Moneymaker, No. CIV-93-179, 1994 WL 637396 (W.D. Okla. July
14, 1994); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, 853 F. Supp. 1023 (E.D. Tenn. 1994), affd, 70
F.3d 1271; Prudential Sec. Inc. v. Sugiura, 844 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. I11. 1994); Shearson Lehman
Bros. Inc. v. Glazer Scott lnvs., No. CA 3-92-0600-T, 1992 WL 558940 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
While the Sixth Circuit has adopted the Seventh and Third Circuits' view that the court should
determine eligibility, it has not conclusively determined whether it adopts their view that the six-
year period may not be equitably tolled by fraudulent concealment. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc. v. McCoy, 70 F.3d 1271, (6th Cir. 1995) (declining to determine if tolling principles
applied, although the dissent persuasively argued that a claim of fraudulent concealment would
toll the six-year rule); Roney & Co., 981 F.2d at 900 (indicating in dicta that tolling principles
would apply). The lower courts addressing the issue have held that equitable tolling principles
apply. See, e.g., McDonald & Co. Sec., Inc. v. Bayer, 910 F. Supp. 348 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (holding
that an action for fraudulent concealment tolls the eligibility rule); First of Mich. Corp. v. Swick,
894 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (fraudulent concealment, if proven, will toll eligibility rule);
Nemecek, 886 F. Supp. at 1345 (same); Davis, 859 F. Supp. at 292-93 (same).
286. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 513 (3rd Cir. 1990).
287. The court expanded the plain language of the rule by incorporating definitions of the
terms "eligibility" and "submission" into Rule 603. Id.
288. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing that the rule was included in the
UCA as a matter of convenience to prevent stale claims from going to arbitration).
289. GRANT, supra note 57, at 138. Indeed, Professor Grant characterized the eligibility rule
as a "private statute of limitations." Id.
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the date of the occurrence or event giving rise to them.290 The eligibil-
ity rule looks and acts like a statute of limitations and the case law
under the FAA mandates that such claims be determined by the arbi-
trator.291 That the eligibility rule was enacted as a "convenience" to
the arbitral forum29 2 and was not intended to undermine substantive
rights293 also strongly suggests that it is procedural in nature.294
Second, the court's reliance on Farnam is misplaced because
Farnam was based on New York law and not on the FAA.2 95 Third,
the court ignored O'Nee1296 when it asserted that the language in Rule
603 was in "stark" contrast to the language found in the cases relied
upon by the Hartmanns. In O'Neel, the NASD Code of Arbitration
contained a five-year time limitation which the court found to be pro-
cedural rather than substantive.2 97 Fourth, the time limitation set
forth in the eligibility rule is not different, in any material way, from
the time limitation set forth in the collective bargaining agreement at
issue in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston.2 98 Both may be condi-
tions precedent to recovery, but "the fact that something is a condi-
tion precedent to arbitration does not make it any less a procedural
question which grows out of the dispute and bears upon its final dispo-
sition. ' 299 Finally, the result reached by the court is completely con-
290. See generally supra note 220 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 256. While the rule is called "Time Limitation Upon Submission," the
text of the rule indicates that claims falling outside the six-year period shall not be eligible for
submission to arbitration. By using the term "eligible," SICA, when it drafted the UCA, unin-
tentionally and unwittingly "elevate[d] a time limitation provision, which is at most a defense to
the claim, to the same level as a limitation imposed upon the subject matter of the agreement to
arbitrate." Harmann, 921 F.2d at 515 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
Under the FAA, if the eligibility rule were to be treated like a statute of limitation, the arbitra-
tors would clearly have the power to determine the timeliness of the claims submitted to arbitra-
tion. A claim that an action is time barred pursuant to the statute of limitations is a defense to
an action and, accordingly, does not impact on the jurisdiction of the tribunal to determine its
applicability. O'Neel v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 667 F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1982).
292. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
293. See infra note 415 and accompanying text (stating that the eligibility rule was not meant
to limit an investor's substantive rights).
294. Jurisdictional limitations usually "reflect the concerns of power over the person and com-
petence over the subject matter .... Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 381 (1990). The eligibility
rule does not appear to be concerned with either of those two considerations, and accordingly,
should not to be treated as a substantive limitation on the arbitrator's jurisdiction.
295. New York law permits a party to make an application to court to bar arbitration if the
claim sought to be arbitrated is untimely pursuant to the statute of limitations. N.Y. Civ. PRAC.
L. & R. § 7502(b) (McKinney 1996).
296. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
297. O'Neel v. National Assn. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 667 F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1982).
298. 376 U.S. 543, 556 n.ll (1964).
299. Local 285, Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. Nonotuck Resource Assocs., Inc., 64 F.3d 735,
740 (1st Cir. 1995).
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trary to the substantive law of the FAA and to general principles of
contract law.
Even if one were to agree with the court that the eligibility issue
touched upon the scope of the arbitration agreement, the Supreme
Court has mandated that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitra-
ble issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the prob-
lem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an
allegation of waiver, delay or a like defense to arbitrability. ''300
By finding that the parties offered two "plausible" interpretations
of Rule 603 and that the language of Rule 603 was not "crystal
clear," 301 the Hartmann court recognized that doubt existed and the
law required that that doubt be resolved in favor of arbitration, even
though the issue involved a defense to the arbitration.30 2 The court
simply refused to compel arbitration because the doubt was not great
enough.303
The fact that the court found Rule 603 to be susceptible to two plau-
sible interpretations indicates that Rule 603 is ambiguous. Contract
law is quite clear that ambiguities in a contract are resolved against
the party who drafted the agreement.3° While the case does not indi-
cate which party drafted the agreement, it can be assumed, from the
common practice within the securities industry, that the contract was a
standardized agreement that the Hartmanns were required to sign by
PaineWebber.30 5 Thus, the ambiguity should have led the court to
compel arbitration, thereby reserving the issue of the timeliness of the
dispute to the arbitrator. As the dissent in Hartmann stated: "We
cannot assume that the arbitrator will not fairly decide the issue of
timeliness of the demand. ' 30 6
The Supreme Court's recent decision in First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan30 7 casts considerable doubt on the result reached in
300. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (em-
phasis added).
301. The Third Circuit later renounced these findings. In PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hofmann, 984
F.2d 1372 (3d Cir. 1993), Hofmann argued that the court in Hartmann determined a factual issue
and, thus, did not preclude the possibility that section 15 of the NASD Code could have a con-
trary interpretation. Id. at 1378. The court rejected that argument stating: "We believe that our
reasoning in Hartmann (though not our express holding) establishes that there is only one rea-
sonable interpretation of section 15; namely, that the language of section 15 unequivocally estab-
lishes a substantive limitation on the claims that may be submitted to arbitration." Id.
302. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25.
303. While the Hartmann court tells us that a flicker of interpretive doubt is not enough to
abide by the Supreme Court mandate, it does not tell us how much doubt would be enough.
304. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1219 (1995).
305. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text (discussing the results of the GAO study).
306. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 515 (3d Cir. 1990) (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
307. 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).
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Hartmann. There, the Court held that the contract of the parties con-
trolled the issue of who should determine whether the parties have
agreed to arbitrate a dispute and that state law controlled a court's
interpretation of the contract. 308 If the parties in their contract in-
tended, pursuant to state law, for the arbitrator to determine arbi-
trability, then a court's review of the arbitrator's decision on that issue
is limited.30 9 If, on the other hand, the contract is silent or ambiguous
as to the question of who will determine the scope of the arbitration
agreement, the court should do so; the presumption in favor of arbi-
trability is thus reversed when the contract is ambiguous. 310 The Hart-
mann court failed to undertake this analysis.
If the analysis called for in First Options is indeed undertaken by
the courts construing the standard arbitration clause, the result should
be that the arbitrator determines issues of timeliness. The standard
securities arbitration agreement typically provides that "any contro-
versies" between the parties be submitted to arbitration. 311 "Any con-
troversies" presumably includes the controversy over who should
determine the timeliness of the claims. Accordingly, under First Op-
tions, the arbitrators should determine whether a claim is time barred.
The Second Circuit recently came to this same conclusion using this
very same analysis. In PaineWebber, Inc. v. Babyk,312 the brokerage
firm sought a stay of arbitration, alleging that the investor's claims
were time barred pursuant to the NASD eligibility rule. The client
agreement, drafted by PaineWebber, provided for arbitration of "any
and all controversies which may arise" concerning the account.313 It
further provided that all claims were to be arbitrated in accordance
with "the rules of the organization convening the panel. '314 The in-
vestor was given the choice to arbitrate before the NASD, the NYSE
or "any other national securities exchange's arbitration forum upon
which PaineWebber is legally required to arbitrate. ' 31 5 The investor
chose the NASD.
In interpreting the client agreement, the court, following First Op-
tions, relied on New York law, which provides that the intent of the
308. Id. at 1924.
309. Id. at 1923.
310. Id.
311. See supra note 57 (including a standard client agreement containing a predispute arbitra-
tion clause requiring arbitration of any controversy arising out of the parties' transaction or
agreement).
312. 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996).
313. Id. at 1196.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 1201.
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parties governs interpretation of the contract.316 It found several pro-
visions in the agreement evidencing the parties' intent to arbitrate the
arbitrability issue. The court relied on, among other things, the "any
and all" language of the predispute arbitration clause.317 The court
found this language to be "inclusive, categorical, unconditional and
unlimited." 318
The court also rejected PaineWebber's argument that the eligibility
rule, which it characterized as a substantive limitation on arbitrability,
required the court to determine the timeliness of the claim.319 The
court, without agreeing or disagreeing with PaineWebber's characteri-
zation of the eligibility rule, concluded that the rule was not incorpo-
rated into the client agreement. 32 0
Recently, the Sixth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, purporting to un-
dertake the analysis required by First Options, all came to the oppo-
site conclusion. In Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. ,321 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen,322 and
Securities Service Network, Inc. v. Cromwell, 323 the courts, relying on
the language of the eligibility rule, concluded that the parties intended
for the court to determine the eligibility issue. At most, the Cohen
court was willing to find the issue ambiguous and, relying on First Op-
tions, reversed the presumption in favor of arbitrability.324
The courts' application of First Options is troubling.325 In attempt-
ing to ascertain the parties' intent, the courts chose to ignore the ex-
plicit language of the parties' agreements and instead relied solely on
the language of the eligibility rule, which was merely incorporated
316. Id. at 1198-99.
317. Id. at 1199.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1200.
320. Id. at 1201. The Second Circuit is the first court to come to this conclusion. The court
also found that, even if the NASD Code of Arbitration was incorporated into the client agree-
ment, the Code itself, through section 35, grants the arbitrator the power to interpret and apply
the eligibility rule. Id.; see infra note 332 and accompanying text (discussing section 35).
321. 78 F.3d 474, 478-79 (10th Cir. 1996).
322. 62 F.3d 381, 384 (11th Cir. 1995).
323. No. 94-5778, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 22450, at *7 (6th Cir. Aug. 1, 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 708 (1996).
324. Cohen, 62 F.3d at 384.
325. A lower federal court has held that the Cohen and Cromwell courts did not properly
construe First Options when they reversed the presumption in favor of arbitrability. In
PaineWebber, Inc. v. Landay, 903 F. Supp. 193, 200 (D. Mass. 1995), the court explained that the
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits misconstrued First Options when they analyzed the eligibility issue
as one involving whether a valid agreement to arbitrate existed in the first instance, rather than
as a secondary issue concerning the scope of a valid agreement. If the proper construction had
been applied, the presumption in favor of arbitration would not have been reversed. Id. at 199-
200.
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into the agreements by the courts, without discussion or explanation.
The language of the agreements, like all standard predispute arbitra-
tion clauses used by the securities industry, provided that any or all
controversies would be submitted to arbitration. 326 It is that language
that the investor most likely read and understood. It is highly unlikely
that the investor was made aware of or otherwise knew of the specifics
of the eligibility rule, and it seems patently illogical and unfair to rely
on that rule to ascertain the investor's intent.32 7
In the final analysis, the Hartmann decision is disturbing, not so
much because the court's reasoning was flawed, but because the deci-
sion demonstrates an unwillingness to evaluate the arbitrability issue
in the context of the Hartmanns' unequal bargaining power. The
court concluded that the parties intended to limit the scope of their
agreement to timely claims. 32 8 It is highly unlikely that the
Hartmanns were aware of or had any knowledge of the contents of
the eligibility rule when they signed the Customer Agreement. Typi-
cally, a Customer Agreement merely states that the arbitration will be
governed by the rules of the SRO forum chosen by the customer. It
does not set forth the content of each and every rule contained in an
SRO's code of arbitration procedure and there is nothing in the agree-
ment that would otherwise alert an investor to the time limitation.
Even assuming arguendo that parties may agree to limit their arbitra-
tion agreement in a "temporal sense, '32 9 such a limitation is typically
326. Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78 F.3d 474, 475 (10th Cir. 1996)
(investor agreed that "any controversy" arising out of agreement shall be submitted to arbitra-
tion); Cohen, 62 F.3d at 382 (parties "entered into a Customer Agreement requiring that all
disputes be resolved by arbitration pursuant to the NASD Code of Arbitration"). The Cromwell
opinion does not provide the language of the agreement requiring arbitration, but it can be
assumed that the language was similar to the standard predispute arbitration clause and required
the arbitration of any or all controversies between the parties related to the investor's account.
See supra note 311 and accompanying text (discussing the language of the standard arbitration
clause).
327. The court in Singer v. Smith Barney Shearson, No. 96-6130-CIV, 1996 WL 245381, *5
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 1996), declined to follow Cohen and distinguished it on the basis that a provi-
sion similar to the one contained in the client agreement in Singer was not quoted in Cohen. The
client agreement in Singer assigned "[any controversy arising out of or relating to... this agree-
ment to arbitration." The existence of this language, missing in the Cohen opinion, led the court
to conclude that the parties intended for the arbitrator to determine the eligibility issue. The
basis upon which the court distinguished Cohen is certainly questionable in view of the fact that
the court in Cohen, while not quoting the specific language of the agreement at issue there, did
state that "all" disputes between the parties were to be resolved by arbitration. The Singer court
apparently believed that the explicit language of the contract, rather than the language of the
eligibility rule, should control the issue of the parties' intent pursuant to First Options, and
needed a basis upon which to ignore precedent, without appearing to do so.
328. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 513 (3d Cir. 1990).
329. Id. at 511.
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explicitly disclosed in the agreement and is the result of mutual, arms-
length negotiation. In view of the lack of information made available
to the Hartmanns and their lack of power to alter or amend any of the
terms of the Customer Agreement, it is disingenuous to assert that
they, or any other investor for that matter, intended to be bound by a
time limitation different than that provided for in the applicable state
or federal statute of limitations. The court's failure to examine or rec-
ognize the unequal bargaining position of the Hartmanns in determin-
ing their intent to limit the scope of the agreement, and its failure to
distinguish the cases where the time limitation was expressly set forth
in the agreement, improperly deprived the Hartmanns of the arbitral
forum for the determination of the timeliness of their claims.
The Eighth Circuit in FSC Securities Corp. v. FreeP30 was the first
circuit to split, but not by disagreeing with the Third and Seventh Cir-
cuits as to whether the eligibility rule was a substantive or procedural
limitation on the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, but by finding that the
parties had intended that the arbitrators would determine the applica-
bility of the eligibility rule by inclusion of section 35 of the NASD
Code of Arbitration Procedure into their agreement.331 Section 35
provides: "The arbitrators shall be empowered to interpret and deter-
mine the applicability of all provisions of this Code .... [which] shall
be final and binding upon the parties. ''332
Although federal law is clear that issues of arbitrability shall be de-
termined by the court, the parties are free to "clearly and unmistaka-
bly" provide otherwise.333 In finding that the inclusion of section 35
evidenced a "clear and unmistakable" intent to have the arbitrators
decide the issue, the Freel court reasoned that when the parties ex-
pressly agree to have their dispute governed by the NASD Code, they
adopt the entire code, including section 35.334 The court found that
330. 14 F.3d 1310 (8th Cir. 1994).
331. While the Freel decision did not directly conflict with the Seventh Circuit's holding re-
garding section 15, it did so with respect to its holding regarding section 35. In Edward D. Jones
& Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 1992), the court, without explanation, held that
section 35 was not a clear and unmistakable expression that the parties intended for the arbitra-
tors to define their own jurisdiction. See also Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 78 F.3d 474, 480 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that section 15 took precedence over the more
general provision of section 35); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3d
381, 384 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that section 35 is not "clear and unmistakable evidence" of the
parties' intent to allow the arbitrator to determine the timeliness of the claim).
332. NASD CODE OF ARITRAMNON PROCEDURE, supra note 216, § 35; Eighth Report, supra
note 30, at 18-19. Section 35 is derived from the UCA, section 22. Id.
333. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1924 (1995); AT&T Tech., Inc. v.
Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).
334. Freel, 14 F.3d at 1312.
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section 35, in no uncertain terms, "commits interpretation of all provi-
sions of the NASD Code to the arbitrators. ' 335 The court would not
render section 35 a nullity by refusing to apply it to the arbitrator's
decision regarding the application of section 15.336
The court's reliance on section 35 is sound. Section 15 is silent as to
who shall make the determination as to eligibility. Section 35, applica-
ble to all the provisions of the Code,337 fills in that silence by unam-
biguously giving the arbitrators the power to interpret and determine
the applicability of section 15. Moreover, when a court determines
eligibility, it has to interpret the meaning of the phrase "occurrence or
event giving rise to the controversy" contained in section 15. That is
arguably a violation of section 35, which leaves that interpretation to
the arbitrators, and is contrary to the parties' intention to have their
controversy settled by arbitration.338 Finally, if a court is going to
charge an investor with the knowledge of the arbitration code provi-
335. Id. By relying on section 35, the court was able to avoid making a determination as to
whether section 15 was procedural or substantive. The district court had found that it was proce-
dural, relying on Automotive, Petroleum & Allied Industries Employees Union v. Town &
Country Ford, Inc, 709 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1983), and used section 35 as an alternative ground for
its holding. FSC See. Corp. v. Freel, 811 F. Supp. 439, 443-45 (D. Minn. 1993).
336. Free!, 14 F.3d at 1312. The court indicated that if the parties had desired that the arbitra-
tor have less discretion than that provided for by section 35, they could have easily limited it by
contract. Id.
The Tenth Circuit recently held that section 35 does not evidence an intent to have the arbitra-
tor decide the timeliness issue. In Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78
F.3d 474 (10th Cir. 1996), the court held that section 15 was a substantive eligibility requirement.
Id. at 480. The court found that the parties did not intend for the arbitrator to determine the
eligibility issue when they included section 35 in their agreement. Id. Section 35 was found to be
unclear and was deemed a general contract term which was qualified by the more specific terms
of section 15. Id.; see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381, 384
(11th Cir. 1995) (observing that, at most, section 35 makes the parties' intent ambiguous and,
therefore, the presumption in favor of arbitrability is lost pursuant to First Options); Securities
Serv. Network, Inc. v. Cromwell, No. 94-5778, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 22540, at *7 (6th Cir. Aug.
1, 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 708 (1996) (holding that section 35 alone does not constitute the
"requisite clear and unmistable [sic] evidence that the parties intended and agreed to arbitrate
the issue of arbitrability"). But see PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1201 (2d Cir.
1996) (stating in dicta that section 35 grants the arbitrator power to interpret and apply section
15); Conroy v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 1471, 1476 (W.D.N.C.
1995) (holding that section 35, in part, mandates that the arbitrator determine issues of
eligibility).
337. Section 15 is not exempt from the coverage of section 35.
338. The Seventh Circuit requires the court to determine the meaning of "occurrence or
event." Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 1992). The Third Circuit
does not follow the Seventh CirCuit's approach and instead requires that if there is a dispute as
to what constitutes the relevant occurrence or event or when the occurrence or event took place,
the court must first determine, by looking at the language of the contract and all relevant extrin-
sic evidence, whether the parties intended to submit those disputes to the arbitrators. See
PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372 (3d Cir. 1993); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith v. Masland, 896 F. Supp. 396 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
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sions of the SRO, it only seems fair to charge them with one that does
not have the effect of depriving the investor of substantive rights to
which he or she would have been entitled had the investor not agreed
to arbitrate the matter in the first instance.
The Fifth Circuit more recently determined that NASD section 15
and AMEX Rule 605 are procedural limitations on arbitrability that
should be determined by the arbitrator. 339 The court in Smith Barney
Shearson, Inc. v. Boone340 rejected Smith Barney's assertion that sec-
tion 15 and Rule 605 are prerequisites to the arbitrator's jurisdic-
tion.341 The court based its decision on John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v.
Livingston342 and other labor arbitration cases where similar timeli-
ness issues were characterized as procedural. 343 The court did not rely
solely on the "plain language" of the eligibility rule as the Third Cir-
cuit had. Rather, it focused on the actual effect of the provision and
saw the provision for what it is: a time bar.344 The court also found
that the broad language of the arbitration agreement indicated that
the parties intended to have "any controversy," including procedural
requirements, resolved through arbitration.345
It seems likely that the First, Ninth, and District of Columbia Cir-
cuits will join the Second,346 Fifth and Eighth Circuits when presented
339. AMEX Rule 605 is identical to NASD section 15 in all material respects.
340. 47 F.3d 750 (5th Cir. 1995).
341. Id. at 754.
342. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
343. Boone, 47 F.3d at 753-54. The only exception to the rule that timeliness issues are proce-
dural is if the timeliness issue will bar arbitration altogether. Id. at 754. That exception was not
applicable in Boone because there was a dispute as to whether the time bar would actually bar
arbitration. The parties disputed when the last act or occurrence giving rise to the claims took
place and whether the time bar should have been tolled due to fraudulent concealment. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Prior to PaineWebber, Inc. v. Babyk, 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996), a conflict had devel-
oped in the lower courts of the Second Circuit regarding the applicability of Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991), to the SRO eligibility rule. In Wagoner, the
Second Circuit stated, albeit in dicta, that issues of timeliness stemming from arbitration associa-
tion rules are procedural and should be determined by the arbitrator. That dicta was followed in
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Noonan, 92 Civ. 3770 (SWK), 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11363, at *27-*28 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1992), where the court, relying on NASD Code
section 35 and Wagoner, determined that the arbitrator should decide whether certain claims
were time barred under the eligibility rule. The same result was reached in Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Shaddock, 822 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). However, in
PaineWebber, Inc. v. Richardson, 94 Civ. 3104 (AGS), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5317, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1995), the court permanently stayed arbitration of claims that were time
barred under the eligibility rule. The court distinguished Wagoner and Shaddock on the basis
that a state statute of limitations was at issue in those cases. Id. at *4. The court also determined
that it was not even required to give those cases any weight in view of Smith Barney, Harris
Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 85 N.Y.2d 193, cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 59 (1995), where the New York
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squarely with the eligibility issue.347 Although the timeliness issue did
not arise in the context of a securities claim, the First Circuit recently
reaffirmed the rule, first laid down in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Liv-
ingston, that timeliness issues are procedural and thus up to the arbi-
trator to decide.348 The District of Columbia Circuit has come to the
Court of Appeals held that the New York rule requiring the court to decide state of limitations
defenses was not preempted by the FAA. There are a variety of problems with that conclusion.
The Richardson court's reliance on Luckie is problematic. First, the court stated that it was
constrained to apply the ruling in Luckie because the action was a diversity action. The law,
however, is quite clear that even in diversity actions the court must follow the FAA and not state
law if the contract calling for arbitration concerns a transaction involving interstate commerce.
The only basis upon which the court could have followed Luckie was if the contract contained a
choice of law provision specifying that the law of the State of New York would govern the
dispute. But even if the agreement stated that New York law would apply, there are still
problems with the court's reliance on Luckie. Luckie involved the question of whether New
York law, CPLR section 7502(b), was preempted by the FAA. Luckie did not involve the eligi-
bility rule. If the court was unwilling to follow Wagoner because it did not involve interpretation
of the eligility rule, Luckie too should not have been deemed controlling. Moreover, the holding
in Luckie is questionable. Luckie applied the CPLR to the contract because of the choice of law
provision. The Supreme Court, two weeks after Luckie was decided, ruled in Mastrobuono that
a choice of law provision does not necessarilty mean that the parties intended to include state
arbitration rules in the choice of law provision. Thus, in the absence of a finding of an intent to
include within the contract the state arbitration rules, the law governing the FAA would apply
and statute of limitations defenses would accordingly be determined by the arbitrator. The Sec-
ond Circuit in Babyk rejected Luckie for precisely this reason. 81 F.3d at 1200. But see Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ohnuma, 630 N.Y.S.2d 724 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (Mas-
trobuono did not alter the result in Luckie).
347. The Fourth Circuit's position is a bit more difficult to ascertain. In County of Durham v.
Richards & Associates, Inc., 742 F.2d 811, 815 (4th Cir. 1984), the court indicated that the arbi-
trator should decide the issue of whether a claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitation.
See also Miller v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 884 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1989) (confirming an arbi-
trator's decision that the claim was time barred under the statute of limitations), cert. denied, 497
U.S. 1004 (1990); Conroy v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 1471, 1475-
76 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (relying on section 35, Miller, and Richards & Assocs. and holding that the
arbitrator may determine the issue of timeliness under eligiblity rule); Humphrey v. Prudential
Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 2:92CV178, 1993 WL 275213, at *4 (E.D. Va. Jan. 8, 1993), appeal dismissed,
4 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that the arbitrator must decide issues of timeliness).
The opposite conclusion was reached in Cigna Securities, Inc. v. Calby, No. 3:92CV345-P, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19941 (W.D.N.C. June 8, 1993), where the court held that the eligibility rule is
a substantive limit on arbitrator's power and in PaineWebber, Inc. v. Allen, Civ. A. No.
3:92CV591, 1993 WL 773623 (E.D. Va. Apr. 29, 1993), affd, 45 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 1995) (per
curiam), where the court found ineligible a RICO claim even though it appeared to be within the
statute of limitations. However, the issues on appeal in Allen involved the court's subject matter
jurisdiction and whether the district court erred in applying the six-year eligibility rule instead of
the RICO statute of limitations. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, without discussion, the application
of the six-year eligibility rule to the RICO claim. The court did not discuss, apparently because
it was not raised on appeal, whether the lower court had properly determined that it had the
power to determine the timeliness of the RICO claim under the eligibility rule.
348. Local 285 Serv. Employees of Int'l Union v. Nonotuck Resources Assocs. Inc., 64 F.3d
735, 739-40 (1st Cir. 1995); see also PaineWebber, Inc. v. Landay, 903 F. Supp. 193, 198 (D. Mass.
1995) (holding that issues of eligibility are to be determined by the arbitrator).
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same conclusion. 349 Finally, in O'Neel v. National Ass'n of Securities
Dealers, Inc.,350 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the arbitrator should de-
termine if a claim was time barred pursuant to the NASD eligibility
rule.351 The court treated the code provision as a statute of limitations
and specifically renounced the argument that "the defense of the stat-
ute of limitations goes to jurisdiction of the tribunal, whether it be
judicial or arbitration. ' 352
The broad language of the standard arbitration clause alone should
dictate that the arbitrator decide the eligibility issue. If that alone is
not enough, the existence of section 35 coupled with the federal policy
favoring arbitration should be.353 The arbitrator should determine eli-
gibility issues for the additional reason that a determination of eligibil-
ity may indeed involve the decision-maker in the merits of the
underlying dispute. The Supreme Court has been emphatic that in
determining arbitrability, the court is not to rule on the potential mer-
its of the dispute 354 and a court cannot avoid the merits if it is deter-
mining the timeliness of a claim.355
2. The Consequences of a Finding of Ineligibility
The majority of courts that have considered the consequence to an
investor of a finding that a claim is ineligible, and therefore barred
from arbitration, have ruled that the investor is also barred from liti-
gating the claim in a judicial forum, even though the claim may still be
349. Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
350. 667 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1982).
351. Id. at 807.
352. Id. In Soares Financial Group, Inc. v. Hansten, No. C 93-4172, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8245, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 1994), both the customer and the NASD took the position that
interpretation of section 15 lies within the exclusive province of the arbitrator. The court, relying
on O'Neel, agreed. Id.
353. The split in the circuit courts has had the effect of causing parties to forum shop. The
Seventh Circuit rejected a blatant and aggressive attempt at forum shopping by a brokerage
firm. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Lauer, 49 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 1995). In that
case, the Lauers initiatied an arbitration with the NASD. Id. at 325. At the request of the
Lauers, the NASD selected Tampa, Florida, where the Lauers resided, for the hearing site. Mer-
rill Lynch thereafter filed an action in the federal court in Illinois, rather than in the federal court
in Florida, seeking to compel arbitration in that district. It also sought the elimination of ineligi-
ble claims and the Lauers' request for punitive damages. Merrill Lynch's attempt to get the case
out of Florida was motivated solely to obtain a more favorable result on the eligibility issue. If
the decision compelling arbitration rested with the Florida rather than the Illinois federal court,
potentially stale claims may have gone to the arbitrator for resolution. If the Northern District
of Illinois decided arbitrability, the Lauers, as the court explained, would have "los[t] a chunk of
their claims." Id. at 325-26.
354. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964).
355. Id. at 557.
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timely under the applicable statute of limitations.356 Those courts
have come to that conclusion by interpreting the SRO code of arbitra-
tion procedure in conjunction with the standard arbitration clause. 357
That conclusion, which is not required by the Code or the standard
arbitration clause, is contrary to federal law, and ignores the unequal
bargaining power between the investor and the broker-dealer.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy 358 contains the most extensive
discussion of the issue to date. There, Dean Witter sought a declara-
tory judgment and injunction against defending claims before the
NASD.359 After ruling that the occurrence or event giving rise to the
claim was the date of the investment, not the date of discovery of the
wrongdoing or the date of "injury," and that fraudulent concealment
by the broker-dealer could not toll the six-year time period, the court
found the claims to be ineligible. 360 The court then hit the investors
with yet another whammy: the investors were barred from litigating
in court those claims found ineligible. 361 In so holding, the court, pur-
suant to the FAA, looked to the terms of the parties' agreement.362
Like all standardized arbitration clauses, the clause here provided that
"[a]ny controversy ... arising out of or relating to this contract or
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration .... ",363 The customer
was given the choice of arbitration before the AAA or the NYSE and
the agreement provided that the arbitration shall take place in accord-
ance with the rules of whichever forum the customer elected.364 As it
356. See, e.g., Kramer v. Smith Barney, 80 F.3d 1080 (5th Cir. 1996); Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. McCoy, No. 94-5779, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 37080 (6th Cir. June 18, 1995); Saunderson v.
Gary Goldberg & Co., Inc., 899 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Conroy v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 1471 (W.D.N.C. 1995); Calabria v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Tex. 1994); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Shelapinsky, Civ. A. No. 93-1553, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10477 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 1994);
Piccolo v. Faragalli, Civ. A. No. 93-2758, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13111 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 1993);
Castellano v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 90 Civ. 1287 (WCC), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7352
(S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1990).
357. See supra note 315.
358. 853 F. Supp. 1023 (E.D. Tenn. 1994), affd, 70 F.3d 1271 (6th Cir. 1995).
359. Id. at 1025.
360. Id. at 1028-30. The court determined eligibility on the basis of Roney & Co. v. Kassab,
981 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1992).
361. McCoy, 853 F. Supp. at 1030. The customers argued that the ineligible claims were nev-
ertheless timely under state limitations periods. Id. at 1034. The court, assuming arguendo that
the customers did have the right to proceed with ineligible claims in court, nevertheless held that
the claims must be dismissed because they were time barred by the applicable statutes of limita-
tions. Id.
362. Id. at 1033.
363. Id. at 1027.
364. Id.
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turned out, the parties further agreed to arbitrate before the
NASD.3
65
The court found that the language of the agreement was unambigu-
ous and that the parties' clear intent was to have all disputes resolved
through arbitration.366 That plain language thereby precluded the use
of a judicial forum for noneligible claims; the customers apparently
waived their right to litigate their claims in a court in favor of arbitra-
tion.367 The court came to this conclusion even though the agreement
did not contain a specific provision waiving the right to litigate ineligi-
ble claims in a judicial forum.368 The court further maintained that if
the investors had wanted to exclude ineligible claims from the cover-
age of the arbitration clause, they could have expressly done so.369
That argument, of course, makes the underlying assumption that when
they signed the contracts, the investors knew they were waiving the
right to bring timely claims in arbitration. The Sixth Circuit agreed
with the lower court, stating that it was undisputed that the customers
"voluntarily entered into an arbitration agreement with Dean Witter
that clearly intends for all disputes to be resolved exclusively through
arbitration." 370
365. Id. at 1023. That was a fatal mistake. The investor should have elected to proceed before
the AAA because the AAA does not have a comparable eligibility rule. Instead the applicable
statute of limitations governing the claim will determine its timeliness. GRANT, supra note 57, at
155 n.16.
366. McCoy, 853 F. Supp. at 1033.
367. Id. at 1030.
368. Id. Other courts have interpreted more direct "waiver" language to find that the investor
forfeited the right to bring timely claims in arbitration and in court. In Conroy, the court found
that the parties clearly agreed to pursue all potential disputes in arbitration and not in court
when they included the following language in the agreement: "[tihe parties are waiving their
right to seek remedies in court, including the right to jury trial." 899 F. Supp. at 1476. Securities
firms are required by SRO rules to include this boilerplate waiver language in arbitration agree-
ments. See infra note 379 (discussing this requirement of the SRO rules).
369. McCoy, 853 F. Supp. at 1033.
370. No. 94-5779, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 37080, at *6-7 (6th Cir. Nov. 27, 1995). The Fifth
Circuit came to the same conclusion. In Kramer v. Smith Barney, 80 F.3d 1080 (5th Cir. 1996),
the court, relying on the very same language relied on in McCoy, found the intention underlying
the agreement to require submission of all claims to arbitration. The court stated that it would
be "bizarre" to interpret the agreement so as to exempt stale claims from arbitration. The
court's characterization that the claims were stale was based, of course, on the eligibility rule, not
on the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 1086. One must wonder if the court would have
come to the same conclusion if the eligibility rule had provided for a shorter time period, such as
six months or a year. It could hardly be argued that claims six months or a year old are stale.
The court's inconsistent use of the language contained in the standard predispute arbitration
clause is painfully obvious. The clause, specifically the language that "any controversies.., shall
be submitted to arbitration," has been interpreted to deprive the investor of the right to proceed
in a judicial forum with ineligible claims. Yet that same clause has not been interpreted to find
that the parties intended arbitration of the controversy concerning the timeliness of the claim
pursuant to the eligibility rule. See supra notes 262-331 and accompanying text. It is indeed
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A more plausible interpretation of the standard predispute arbitra-
tion clause is that the parties, when they agreed to arbitrate any con-
troversy pursuant to the chosen forum's rules, agreed to arbitrate only
those controversies that are deemed eligible for arbitration according
to those rules. That reading would reserve the ineligible claims for a
judicial forum. This seems to be the interpretation adopted by the
courts that have upheld the customer's right to maintain ineligible
claims in a judicial forum.371 Indeed, these courts assumed, without
examination of the arbitration clause, the availability of a judicial fo-
rum for ineligible claims. Although some courts have rejected these
cases for precisely that assumption, 372 such an assumption comports
with the most natural understanding of an agreement to arbitrate. In
other words, an agreement to arbitrate is an agreement waiving the
right to go to a judicial forum, but only to the extent that the arbitral
forum, for whatever reason, is willing to accept the claim.373
ironic that the broker-dealer, the drafter of the clause, receives the benefit of its broadness, but
not the burden of it, and that the investor, who has no power to alter or amend the clause, is
deprived of a judicial forum with respect to ineligible claims and an arbitral forum with respect
to the eligibility issue.
371. E.g., Prudential Sec., Inc., v. Moneymaker, No. Civ.-93-179, 1995 WL 637396 (W.D.
Okla. July 14, 1994); Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Saint Pierre, No. 92 C 5735, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18649 (N.D. I11. Dec. 23, 1993); Prudential Sec. Inc. v. LaPlant, 829 F. Supp.
1239 (D. Kan. 1993); Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Seimetz, No. 5:93 CV 0647, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16358 (N.D. Ohio May 21, 1993).
It is not inconsistent to allow the investor to argue that he or she was agreeing to arbitrate
only eligible claims and at the same time prohibit the broker-dealer from arguing that he or she
only agreed to arbitrate eligible claims when deciding who should determine the issue of eligibil-
ity. The broker-dealer, not the customer, drafted the agreement and had the power to clarify his
or her intentions.
372. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Shelapinsky, Civ. A. No. 93-1553,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10477 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 1994).
373. If the eligibility rule is amended, rather than eliminated, and the amendment does not
bar maintenance of ineligible claims before a judicial forum, the situation may develop where a
customer has eligible and ineligible claims. If the ineligible claims go to court, two proceedings
could conceivably take place involving related claims. While this result would undoubtedly be
wasteful, it would be necessary to preserve the investor's substantive rights. However, at least
one court, relying on section 15, ordered ineligible and eligible claims to arbitration to avoid the
maintenance of two separate proceedings. In Prudential Securities, Inc. v. Seimetz, No. 5:93 CV
0647, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16358 (N.D. Ohio May 21, 1993), the court was called upon to
determine the eligibility of certain claims. After stating that the parties may be forced to engage
in two separate proceedings, one before the arbitration panel for clearly eligible claims and one
before the court for the arguably ineligible claims, the court ordered both types of claims to
arbitration in order to avoid duplicative, time-consuming and expensive proceedings. Id. at *6.
But see LaPlant, 829 F. Supp. at 1239 (D. Kan. 1993) (holding that although ineligible claims
would be subject to litigation in court, in accordance with Seimetz, it was unwilling to order
ineligible claims to arbitration even though such result was appealing from a judicial economy
and litigation efficiency standpoint).
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The ineligibility of class actions for SRO arbitration exemplifies this
point. SICA amended the UCA to exempt from arbitration claims
filed as class actions. 374 The SROs adopted the amendment and the
SEC approved it.375 The amended rule states that such claims are not
eligible for submission to arbitration.376 That ineligibility does not
now mean that when an investor signs an agreement to arbitrate
"any" controversy with his or her broker-dealer and his or her claim
turns out to be part of a class action, he or she is precluded from
seeking redress for that class action claim in a judicial forum. No one
would dare suggest that result, even if the agreement did not specifi-
cally indicate that class actions are exempt from arbitration.
Even if one were not to agree that it is more plausible that the in-
vestor intended to arbitrate only eligible claims, as that term is de-
fined by the SRO arbitral forum, at the very least, such an
interpretation is equally as plausible, thereby making the agreement
ambiguous. That ambiguity alone should permit the litigation of the
ineligible claims in a judicial forum. Ambiguous terms in contracts
are construed against the interests of the party who drafted them. 377
Here, Dean Witter, the likely drafter of the agreement 378 and the
party in the superior bargaining position, could have indicated that the
agreement included a waiver of a judicial forum for both eligible and
ineligible claims. Because Dean Witter did not so indicate, the inves-
tor should have been permitted to litigate the claims in a judicial fo-
rum. It is patently unfair to put the onus on the investor to provide
for a judicial forum for ineligible claims inasmuch as the investor has
no awareness of the eligibility rule and the broker-dealer did nothing
374. See Eighth Report, supra note 30, at 6-7.
375. See, e.g., Self Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by
American Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating To Arbitration, Exchange Act Release No. 32864, 54
S.E.C. Docket 2052 (Sept. 10, 1993); Self Regulatory Organizations; National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of
Class Actions from Arbitration Proceedings, Exchange Act Release No. 31371, 52 S.E.C. Docket
2189 (Oct. 28, 1992) [hereinafter Release No. 31371].
376. See, e.g., NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATON PROCEDURE, § 12(d)(1) (Mar. 1995). When
amending its Code of Arbitration Procedure, the NASD also amended its Rules of Fair Practice
to require that predispute arbitration agreements contain a notice that class actions may not be
arbitrated. Release No. 31371, supra note 375. If notice is required for the exclusion of class
actions from arbitration, it must be questioned why explicit notice is not required for the exclu-
sion of ineligible claims, where the case is even more compelling for notice inasmuch as ineligi-
ble claims, unlike class action claims, cannot be maintained in a judicial forum.
377. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc,, 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1219 (1995).
378. It is fair to assume, in accordance with industry custom, that Dean Witter drafted the
agreement and was unwilling to negotiate the clause.
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in the agreement itself to alert the investor to it.379 Moreover, it is
unrealistic that an investor, even if he or she knew of the six-year rule,
could get the broker-dealer to amend the standard arbitration clause.
The evidence is clear that such clauses are not negotiable. 380 Dean
Witter drafted the agreement and the ambiguity should be construed
against it-not against the powerless investor.
This is precisely the approach the Supreme Court took in Mas-
trobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.381 There, an issue arose as
to whether a customer waived the right to have an arbitrator assess
punitive damages when it signed an arbitration agreement containing
a provision providing for the application of New York law. 382 New
York law prohibits the awarding of punitive damages by arbitrators. 38 3
Because the Court found the agreement to be ambiguous, the Court
refused to interpret it in a manner that would cause the investor to
unintentionally give up an important substantive right.384 The Court
held that the agreement should not be read to preclude the arbitrator
from awarding punitive damages:
[R]espondents cannot overcome the common-law rule of contract
interpretation that a court should construe ambiguous language
against the interest of the party that drafted it. Respondents
drafted an ambiguous document, and they cannot now claim the
benefit of the doubt. The reason for the rule is to protect the party
who did not choose the language from an unintended or unfair re-
sult. That rationale is well-suited to the facts of this case. As a
practical matter, it seems unlikely that the petitioners were actually
aware on New York's bifurcated approach to punitive damages, or
that they had any idea that by signing a standard-form agreement to
arbitrate disputes they might be giving up an important substantive
right. In the face of such doubt, we are unwilling to impute this
intent to petitioners. 385
379. SRO rules provide that certain disclosures regarding the nature of arbitration be con-
tained in the agreement between the investor and the securities firm. For example, New York
Stock Exchange Rule 636(a) requires that a predispute arbitration clause notify an investor that
(i) arbitration is final and binding on the parties; (ii) the parties are waiving their right to seek
remedies in court; (iii) prearbitration discovery is generally more limited and different from
court proceedings; (iv) the arbitrator's award is not required to include factual findings or legal
reasoning and any parties' right to appeal or seek modification of rulings by arbitrators is strictly
limited; and (v) the panel of arbitrators will typically include a minority of arbitrators who were
or are affiliated with the securities industry. NYSE Rule 636(a); see also UCA § 31, Eighth
Report, supra note 30, at 24. There is no requirement that the customer be notified of the
eligibility rule and its effect on an otherwise timely claim.
380. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the results of the GAO Report).
381. 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
382. Id. at 1215.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 1219.
385. Id. (citations omitted).
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It cannot be disputed that the result in McCoy was not only unin-
tended, but unforeseen, by the investors.386 Indeed, defendants ar-
gued that if a waiver was found, it should only be deemed a partial
waiver, not one waiving substantive rights. 387 Although the defend-
ants' argument was sound and amply supported by prior Supreme
Court pronouncements, the court was not persuaded; it was unable to
discern "how an agreement ... to limit the resolution of any disputes
between them to NASD arbitration instead of litigation in the courts
constitutes a waiver of the defendants' substantive rights. ' 38  The
court was looking at the issue too broadly and too generally. The in-
vestors were not arguing that arbitration as an alternative means of
dispute resolution resulted in the waiver of substantive rights. Rather,
the waiver resulted from the application of the forum's eligibility rule.
If the majority of the courts are correct that the customer does, in
fact, waive bringing timely claims in an arbitral and judicial forum
when they agree to arbitrate future controversies, the customer is un-
knowingly relinquishing a substantive right. The substantive law of a
cause of action gives a party the right to bring the action within a
specific time period. If a party has a claim that is within that time
period, that party has a substantive right. The existence of the eligibil-
ity rule coupled with the courts' interpretation of the standard arbitra-
tion clause deprives the investor of this substantive right.389 Thus, the
investor is not receiving in the arbitral forum the same rights that he
or she would have been entitled to receive in the judicial forum. This
result goes well beyond what parties bargain for when they agree to
arbitrate. It is generally understood that certain procedural protec-.
tions are done away with in arbitration. It is not known, expected or
understood that the right to seek redress of a timely claim itself is
given up in exchange for the simplified procedures of the arbitral
forum.
The Supreme Court, when it endorsed SRO arbitration, did so on
the basis that the streamlined procedures do not result in the loss of
386. Surely the clause considered in McCoy is no less ambiguous than the one considered in
Mastrobuono. In Mastrobuono, the contract provided that it would be "governed by the laws of
the State of New York." Id. at 1216. The Court found that an ambiguity existed regarding
whether that clause included New York's procedural rules applicable to arbitration or whether it
just covered the substantive law of New York. Id. at 1217-18.
387. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, 853 F. Supp. 1023, 1034 (E.D. Tenn. 1994).
388. Id.
389. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, No. 94-5779, U.S. App. LEXIS 37080, at *7
(6th Cir. Nov. 27, 1995) (Moore, J., dissenting) (noting that the refusal to apply equitable tolling
principles to eligibility rule results in denying the investor's substantive right to pursue "stale"
claims if he or she can prove fraudulent concealment).
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substantive rights.390 In Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsonAmerican
Express, Inc.,391 the Court held that certain procedural provisions, not
substantive provisions, contained in the Securities Act could be
waived by agreeing to arbitrate a controversy. 392 The SRO's attempt
to keep "stale" claims out of arbitration through the device of the
eligibility rule has the effect of depriving unsuspecting customers of
important substantive rights. The Supreme Court has expressed an
unwillingness to interpret ambiguous language in the standard arbitra-
tion agreement so as to deprive a customer of a substantive right.393
The same result is warranted with respect to the eligibility rule. If a
customer has failed to bring a claim within the six-year period speci-
fied by the eligibility rule, that customer should not then be barred
from bringing that claim in a judicial forum if indeed the claim is
timely pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations.
Clearly, if the SRO arbitral forum's procedural rules, or, for that
matter, the agreement to arbitrate, contained a provision requiring the
submission to arbitration of claims alleging violation of the Securities
Act within a time period shorter than that provided for in the Securi-
ties Act, there would be no dispute that the provision or the agree-
ment was improper. The Supreme Court has declared that the
substantive rights afforded by statute cannot be waived and the SEC
has unequivocally stated that a predispute arbitration clause cannot be
"used to curtail any rights that a party may otherwise have had in a
judicial forum," 394 nor may such clause "be used to shorten applicable
statutes of limitation. '395
The Fifth Circuit declared void the eligibility rule contained in the
AMEX Code of Arbitration to the extent that it impaired an inves-
tor's substantive rights under the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974 (ERISA). 396 In Kramer, the investor asserted both
ERISA and non-ERISA claims. 397 The investor argued that the ER-
ISA claims were timely pursuant to both the eligibility rule398 and the
390. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing the McMahon Court's analysis).
391. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
392. Id. at 481.
393. Id. at 485.
394. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the New
York Stock Exchange, Inc., National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and the American
Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute Arbitration
Clauses, Exchange Act Release No. 26805 [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,414, at 80,113 (May 16, 1989).
395. Id.
396. Kramer v. Smith Barney, 80 F.3d 1080 (5th Cir. 1996).
397. Id. at 1082.
398. Id. at 1084.
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applicable statute of limitations.399 The claims, however, were time
barred pursuant to the eligibility rule.400 The court held that the eligi-
bility rule, to the extent it rendered timely claims under ERISA ineli-
gible for arbitration, resulted in a waiver of substantive rights under
ERISA, which ERISA explicitly prohibited.40 1 Accordingly, the court
ordered the arbitration of the ERISA claims and left the determina-
tion of their compliance with the time requirements of ERISA to the
arbitrator.40 2
With respect to the non-ERISA claims, the court held that it was
bound to give preclusive effect to a judgment by a New York state
court finding the claims ineligible for arbitration. 40 3 The court further
refused to require a judicial forum for the adjudication of the ineligi-
ble claims.404 The court's refusal to order the ineligible but timely
state law claims to a judicial forum deprived the investor of substan-
tive rights granted by the state law. The court did not explain why it
was permissible to deprive the investor of rights derived from the ap-
plicable state statute of limitations but impermissible with respect to
the rights derived from the ERISA statute of limitations. The anti-
waiver language of ERISA does not provide a complete explanation.
Even if one were to agree that a state statute of limitations, unlike the
ERISA statute of limitations, can be waived by the investor, it can
hardly be maintained that the investor knowingly waived it when he
or she signed the agreement. The waiver comes about through the
application of the eligibility rule, which, of course, is not explicitly
stated in the agreement and which is not otherwise brought to the
attention of the investor.
Similarly, in Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Products Co.,405 the Ninth Cir-
cuit permitted a gasoline distribution franchisee to sue a franchisor in
court despite the existence of an arbitration agreement. 40 6 The court
found that the arbitration agreement, which expressly required the
franchisee to forfeit the one-year statute of limitations period con-
tained in the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, violated the Act.40 7
399. The ERISA six-year statute of limitations permitted tolling in cases of fraud or conceal-
ment. Id.
400. Id. at 1085.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 1085 n.4.
403. Id. at 1086.
404. Id.
405. 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 275 (1995).
406. Id. at 1246.
407. Id. at 1247.
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The court severed the arbitration clause from the remainder of the
agreement.408
The eligibility rule should be treated no differently and should like-
wise be found improper. The rule has the same purpose and effect as
a statute of limitations. The fact that the claims forfeited by customers
due to the eligibility rule will be mostly state common law claims
should not affect the analysis. The origin of the rights asserted should
not matter. What is significant for the analysis is that claims are being
forfeited, and what is particularly egregious is that the forfeiture was
not made known to the investor when he or she signed the agreement
containing the arbitration clause. As the Ninth Circuit stated: "[T]he
fact that franchisees may agree to an arbitral forum for the resolution
of statutory disputes in no way suggests that they may be forced by
those with dominant economic power to surrender the statutorily-
mandated rights and benefits that Congress intended them to pos-
sess. '40 9 Similarly, investors should not be forced to give up the limi-
tations period (with its accrual and discovery rules) that Congress,
state legislatures, or state or federal courts intend them to possess.
Various justifications have been advanced by the courts barring liti-
gation in a judicial forum of ineligible claims. One justification, which
has already been discussed, is that the investor could have reserved
for himself or herself in the arbitration agreement the right to bring
ineligible claims in a judicial forum.410 That justification appears to
almost wilfully ignore the reality of an investor's bargaining position
with the securities firm and it is manifestly misleading by creating the
impression that the investor had any bargaining power to make that
reservation in the first instance. As the GAO Report found, the cus-
tomer is effectively precluded from making any amendments to the
arbitration clause.411 In other words, the customer is unable to pro-
tect himself or herself in the manner suggested by the courts.
Another justification offered is that if the court were to allow a cus-
tomer to bring ineligible claims in a judicial forum, such result would
encourage a customer seeking to avoid arbitration to wait until the
SRO time period expired and then bring the action in federal or state
court.412 That justification is specious. It is hard to imagine that an
408. Id. at 1248.
409. Id. at 1247.
410. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, 853 F. Supp. 1023, 1030 (E.D. Tenn. 1994).
411. GAO Report, supra note 28, at 30.
412. See Conroy v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 1471, 1476
(W.D.N.C. 1995); Saunderson v. Gary Goldberg & Co., Inc., 899 F. Supp. 177, 180 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); Piccolo v. Faragalli, Civ. A. No. 93-2758, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13111, at *6 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 24, 1993); see also Calabria v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 172,
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investor would knowingly sit on a claim and risk being untimely in
violation of a statutory limitation period just to avoid having to bring
the claim in an arbitral forum. Moreover, this is particularly unlikely
inasmuch as a customer may have the benefit of bringing certain
claims in arbitration that he or she would not be permitted to bring in
the judicial forum. For example, a claim alleging that a broker-dealer
violated the SRO suitability rule would probably not be cognizable in
court but would be allowed in arbitration.413
3. SICA 's Position
As discussed, the eligibility rule in its present form in the SROs'
arbitration procedure codes is derived from the eligibility rule as origi-
nally drafted by SICA, as amended in 1984.414 However, SICA did
not intend for the rule to deprive a customer of his or her right to
bring ineligible claims in a judicial forum.415 Accordingly, SICA
amended its rule in April 1993416 to make it conform to its original
intent and make it clear that a claim found to be ineligible is neverthe-
less permitted to go to a judicial forum, despite the existence of the
predispute arbitration clause.417 SICA also amended the rule to clar-
174 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (noting that interpreting the arbitration clause as barring a judicial forum
for ineligible claims serves as an impetus for the parties to present their disputes in a timely
fashion).
413. THOMAS L. HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION 504 (3d ed. 1996).
414. The 1984 amendments basically made clear that the eligibility rule would not act as a bar
if a court of competent jurisdiction ordered the case to arbitration.
415. As stated by Professor Katsoris, an original member of SICA, "The clear intent was not
to create a new statute of limitation, nor was it intended to prevent somebody from asserting
their remedy elsewhere, absent the six year rule." NYSE Symposium, supra note 12, at 1533; see
also Katsoris, Should McMahon Be Revisited?, supra note 6, at 1123 (stating the the "eligibility
rule was never intended to limit or eradicate claimants' rights. Unfortunately, some courts have
interpreted this rule as substantive instead of merely procedural, thus denying claimant's relief
after the six years elapsed."); Task Force Report, supra note 43, at 87,440.
416. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Amended Proposed Rule Change by
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to the Eligibility of Disputes for Arbi-
tration, Exchange Act Release No. 34442, 57 S.E.C. Docket 614 (July 26, 1994) [hereinafter
Release No. 34442]; see Katsoris, Should McMahon Be Revisited?, supra note 6, at 1123 n.60.
417. The amended rule provides:
(a) No dispute, claim or controversy shall be eligible for submission to arbitration
under this Code if six (6) years have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to
the act or the dispute, claim, or controversy. This section shall not extend applicable
statutes of limitation.
(b) Where eligibility is disputed by a responding party after service of the Statement of
Claim, the Director of Arbitration shall promptly make a final determination as to
whether a claim is eligible for arbitration. Any such determination regarding eligibility
shall set forth the occurrence or event which was the basis for the determination of
eligibility of the dispute, claim or controversy. The identification of the occurrence or
event which formed the basis for a determination that a claim is eligible shall not limit
1996]ELIGIBILITY RULE IN SECURITIES ARBITRATION 171
ify that the director of arbitration shall make the eligibility
determination.41 8
No SRO has adopted the SICA 1993 amendment to the eligibility
rule.419 The NASD filed a notice in October 1993 with the SEC pro-
posing amendments to section 15 which were almost identical to the
SICA amendment.420 That proposal was apparently withdrawn. The
NASD again proposed to amend section 15 in July 1994.421 That
amendment, although still similar to the amended eligibility rule con-
tained in the UCA, substantially expanded the October 1993 proposed
amendment. 422 The July 1994 proposal was withdrawn as well.423
However, in that proposal, the NASD confirmed that the original in-
any parties' right to offer evidence to the arbitrators which relates to their substantive
claims or defenses.
(c) A determination by the Director of Arbitration pursuant to subparagraph (b) that
a claim is ineligible shall not constitute a bar to asserting the underlying claim in a
judicial forum. The parties will have available to them the rights and remedies pro-
vided by applicable law, notwithstanding, any (i) existing predispute arbitration agree-
ment or (ii) decision of eligibility. No party shall seek to enforce any agreement to
arbitrate where the claim has been determined to be ineligible under this section.
Eighth Report, supra note 30, at 9.
418. That amendment was a compromise among SICA members. Some believed that the ar-
bitrators should make the eligibility determination. NYSE Symposium, supra note 12, at 1539.
419. Katsoris, Should McMahon Be Revisited?, supra note 6, at 1131.
420. Self Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to the Eligibility of Disputes for Arbitration,
Exchange Act Release No. 33108, 55 S.E.C. Docket 762 (Oct. 26, 1993).
421. See Release No. 34442, supra note 416.
422. Id.
423. Telephone Interview with Ethan Corey, Staff Attorney at the SEC (June 19, 1995). For a
discussion as to the details and merits of the NASD's second proposal, see Bukhman, Time
Limitations on Arbitrability, supra note 230.
In 1994, the NASD appointed a nine-person task force, chaired by former SEC Commissioner
David S. Ruder to "study the history and goals of the arbitration process and to make recom-
mendations for the future form and structure of securities arbitrations." Martin L. Budd, Securi-
ties Industry Arbitration - Recent Issues, C977 ALI-ABA 205 (Jan. 1995). The task force issued
its report, Securities Arbitration Reform, in early 1996, and recommended, among other things,
the "prospective suspension of the eligibility rule." Task Force Report, supra note 43, at 87,442-
43. This recommendation was predicted to be "hotly debated." David R. Robbins, Securities
Law, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 12, 1996, at B6.
The task force recommended that the NASD eligibility rule be suspended for a three-year
period and be replaced with procedures to resolve dispositive motions on statute of limitations
grounds. The task force called for the early resolution of such motions by the arbitration panel
and recommended that the motions be decided on the papers, unless an evidentiary hearing was
required to resolve fact issues. It was also recommended that the arbitrators provide written
opinions setting forth their reasoning on the statute of limitations issue and it was suggested that
arbitrators receive special training regarding such issues. Task Force Report, supra note 43, at
87,442-43. Professor Katsoris, while favoring the elimination of the eligibility rule, did not favor
the "conditions" the task force imposed for the suspension of the rule. Katsoris, SICA, supra
note 59, at 532.
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tent of the eligibility rule was not to bar a judicial forum for ineligible
claims.424
While the NASD has attempted to amend its eligibility rule, the fact
of the matter is that no SRO has adopted the SICA amendment, the
very purpose of which is to conform the ruie to its original meaning.
The SROs have no incentive to do so inasmuch as the eligibility rule,
as interpreted by most courts, is much more favorable to the members
of the SROs than it is to the investors.425 If that is indeed the reason,
then the SROs not only "undermine SICA's efforts to achieve a level
playing field" 426 between investor and broker-dealer but are also re-
neging on their promises and representations made to the SEC. As
will be recalled, the SEC was poised to take action with respect to
SRO arbitration procedures and declined to do so on the basis that
SICA, consisting of members from the securities industry and from
the public alike, reformed SRO arbitration procedures, which were
found to be in the public interest.4 27 It is beyond dispute that the
SROs' position on the eligibility rule is not only inconsistent with the
public interest but is contrary to SICA's position as well.
4. The SEC's Position
The SEC has the authority to require an SRO to adopt rules with
respect to the conduct of arbitrations.42 8 Indeed, that authority may
424. Exchange Act Release No. 34442, supra note 416. "The eligibility rule never was in-
tended to serve as an election of remedy provision that would eviscerate any surviving causes of
action under applicable law after six years have elapsed." Id. at 6.
This language was omitted from the first notice of the proposed rule change published in
October 1993. The investors in Calabria v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 855 F.
Supp. 172, 176-77 (N.D. Tex. 1994) and in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. She-
lapinsky, Civ. A. No. 93-1553, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10477, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 1994),
relying on the first notice to amend the eligibility rule, argued that the eligibility rule should not
be interpreted so as to deprive them of a judicial forum for their ineligible claims and used the
proposed rule in support of their argument. The courts were not persuaded that the proposed
rule change required it to allow the ineligible claims to proceed in a judicial forum because the
amendment had not yet been adopted and there was no indication that the amendment repre-
sented the original intent of section 15. A very different result may have been reached if the first
notice had contained the language contained in the second notice.
425. While the eligibility rule has caused much contentious litigation, see Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34442, supra note 416, at 11, which is both costly and time-consuming and contradicts
the concept behind requiring disputes to go to an arbitral forum, the securities firms will con-
tinue to litigate as long as the costs do not exceed what the investor would get on the claim. It is
unlikely that the costs will exceed the claim inasmuch as the eligibility issue is usually deter-
mined early in the litigation pursuant to a motion to dismiss.
426. Katsoris, Should McMahon Be Revisited?, supra note 6, at 1149.
427. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC's deferral of its own action
regarding a single system for customer disputes).
428. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (noting that the SEC has the power to request
that the SROs amend their own rules to provide for a dispute resolution system).
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have influenced the Court's decision in McMahon. 42 9 The Court
seemed to rely, in part, on the SEC's oversight authority to ensure the
fairness of the SRO arbitration process. 430 The presence of the SEC
may have relieved the Court of the burden of examining in detail the
procedures to which an investor is subjected when he or she agrees to
arbitrate. The authority given to the SEC over the SRO rules was
touted as the one change that caused the SEC to amend its position on
arbitration and to endorse it before the Court in McMahon.431
The SEC has exercised its oversight authority to some extent. Dur-
ing 1986 and 1987, the SEC staff conducted a review of SRO arbitra-
tion.432 It found that securities industry arbitration generally operated
fairly but that certain improvements were needed. 433 Shortly after
McMahon, the SEC sent SICA a letter containing a list of areas where
changes were needed.434 The SEC recommended, among other
things, that the standards for eligibility to serve as a public arbitrator
be revised; that the SRO disclose to the parties the background and
affiliations of the arbitrators; that procedures be developed for the
written explanation of the arbitrators' award; that discovery be ex-
panded; that a record of the proceedings be made; and that programs
be instituted for training and evaluation of the arbitrators.435 The
UCA was overhauled in 1989 to incorporate the changes suggested by
the SEC and to make other changes that the SROs and SICA sug-
gested.436 None of those changes, however, involved the eligibility
rule. In fact, the SEC has not taken a position with respect to the
appropriateness or legality of the eligibility rule. The SEC has been
criticized as taking action only to diffuse the controversy surrounding
the predispute arbitration clause and not taking action to equalize the
relationship between the broker-dealer and investor.437 That criticism
certainly rings true with respect to the eligibility rule.
The SEC has knowledge of the controversy surrounding the eligibil-
ity rule. It published the NASD's proposed amendments to section
429. See supra note 194-96 and accompanying text (noting the SEC's change in position re-
garding securities arbitration which influenced the Court's decision in McMahon).
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. McGuire & Love, supra note 66, at 438.
433. Id.
434. Katsoris, The Level Playing Field, supra note 6, at 470.
435. McGuire & Love, supra note 66, at 437; see also Grant, supra note 6, at 515-16 (noting
that the SEC suggested fifteen specific improvements).
436. Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, Sixth Report of the Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration 2-3 (Aug. 1989); see also Katsoris, The Level Playing Field, supra
note 6, at 452.
437. Gregory & Schneider, supra note 6, at 1247-48.
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15, which amendments contained a detailed account of conflicting
case law. It also has knowledge that SICA amended the eligibility
rule and that no SRO has since adopted that amendment.438 While
the SEC may not be faulted for initially giving the securities industry
an opportunity to amend its rules, it certainly can be faulted for not
stepping in when those SROs flagrantly declined to adopt the SICA
amendment to the eligibility rule. The SEC relinquished its plan to
create a quasi-independent agency to handle customer and broker-
dealer disputes in reliance on the promises made by the industry that
it would sponsor arbitration in a fair and just manner. The industry
has failed to follow through on that promise and the SEC has not held
it accountable. If the public cannot trust the SEC to override the se-
curities industry's self-serving position with respect to the eligibility
rule, the public's perception of SRO arbitration will never improve
and the future of SRO arbitration may be jeopardized. An investor
may be able to convince the Supreme Court that the SEC has not
provided the oversight that the Court relied upon in the McMahon
decision. The SEC apparently thinks arbitration is a good thing for
both investors and broker-dealers and it presumably would not want
to see the Court revisit McMahon.
5. Fairness Studies
Various studies have been conducted that provide a level of comfort
to those questioning the actual fairness of SRO arbitration. Those
studies indicate that SRO arbitration is fair in fact, so to say, and that
the real problem is the perception of fairness that the public has, due
to the fact that the arbitral forum is sponsored by the securities indus-
try. Those fairness studies, however, should not end the inquiry into
the actual fairness of SRO arbitration because they do not take into
account the investor who has been deprived of both an arbitral and
judicial forum for the resolution of ineligible claims.
a. SRO Arbitration Versus a Judicial Forum
There have been a variety of studies conducted to determine if in-
vestors fare as well in arbitration as they would in litigation.439 While
the studies are not definitive and various problems have been identi-
fied with each,"40 the consensus seems to be that "customers are not
438. See supra note 419.
439. See FLETCHER, supra note 91, at 97-104 (discussing studies conducted by the SROs, a
brokerage house and an accounting firm for a national stock exchange); see also Grant, supra
note 6, at 399-402; Gregory & Schneider, supra note 6, at 1240-44.
440. FLETCHER, supra note 91, at 99-104.
[Vol. 46:109
1996]ELIGIBILITY RULE IN SECURITIES ARBITRATION 175
obviously more likely to recover more in one forum than the
other."'441 That conclusion is based on comparing the amount recov-
ered in litigation versus the amount recovered in arbitration.442 That
conclusion fails to take into account the customer who recovers noth-
ing because he or she has been deprived of a forum for the resolution
of his or her claim. The NASD has indicated that there are numerous
claims that SROs reject because of ineligibility even before they are
served on the securities firms. 443 Obviously those claims are not in-
cluded in the figures inasmuch as they are unknown to the brokerage
firms and they do not even reach the arbitration panel for a ruling.
Until the ineligible customer is included in the figures, the actual fair-
ness of SRO arbitration vis-a-vis a judicial forum cannot be
determined.
b. SRO Arbitration Versus AAA Securities Arbitration
The GAO444 was directed to analyze the results of securities arbitra-
tion at industry-sponsored forums and to compare those results with
those of the AAA, the primary independent forum for securities arbi-
tration." 5 The purpose was to determine if the nonindependent status
of the SRO arbitral forums had any bearing on the ability of the cus-
tomer to recover. 446 The GAO concluded that the forum at which the
decision was made did not affect an investor's chances of receiving an
award.447 About sixty percent of investors received an award at SRO
forums and at the AAA and the award averaged about sixty percent
of the amount claimed.4 48 While that conclusion may lend support to
the argument that SRO arbitration is fair, there was nothing in the
report indicating that it considered ineligible claims in its analysis.
The failure to do so is critical. The SRO forums all have the eligibility
rule, the AAA does not.449 Accordingly, a person who has a claim
where more than six years have elapsed from the date of the occur-
rence or event giving rise to the claim would be ineligible to proceed
in an SRO forum but would be permitted to proceed and recover at
the AAA (assuming, of course, that the claim is timely pursuant to the
applicable statute of limitations). Obviously, SRO arbitration is not as
441. Id. at 102.
442. Id. at 100-02.
443. NYSE Symposium, supra note 12, at 1544.
444. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing the origin of the GAO's study).
445. GAO Report, supra note 28, at 4.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 7.
448. Id.
449. AAA CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR SECURITIES DISPUTES (May 1993).
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fair as AAA arbitration with respect to the investor with the timely
but ineligible claim.
V. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
When the Supreme Court endorsed SRO arbitration, it did so on a
wholesale basis. The Court adopted it completely, without examina-
tion or analysis of any of the specific procedures contained in the SRO
code of arbitration procedure. Only the overall structure of arbitra-
tion was analyzed. Only the general procedures were examined. The
overall structure and the general procedures were accepted by the
Supreme Court as being adequate. That acceptance has apparently
led to the unfortunate conclusion that the specific procedures adopted
by the arbitral forum are immune from examination.
Generally, the procedural rules enacted by a forum will govern the
controversy at hand, regardless of the origin of the rights being as-
serted. Thus, if an action based on state law is brought in federal
court due to diversity jurisdiction, the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure will govern.4 50 Similarly, when an action is brought in state
court, based on its concurrent jurisdiction, for a violation of federal
law, the state court's procedural rules will typically apply.4 51 This gen-
eral rule leads one to assume that when an action is brought in an
arbitral forum, based on its "consensual" jurisdiction, the procedural
rules of the arbitral forum will govern, regardless of whether the claim
is based on state or federal law.452 Thus, if the parties consent to the
NASD arbitral forum, the NASD's Code of Arbitration Procedure
will control.
The above-stated general rule, that the forum's procedural rules will
govern the dispute before it, is not, however, blindly applied. For ex-
ample, while the general rule, "bottomed deeply in the belief in the
importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal
law takes the state courts as it finds them," 453 it is not applicable when
those rules "impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery au-
thorized by federal law."'454 In Brown v. Western Railway of Ala-
450. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10
(1941).
451. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988).
452. The procedural rules are usually deemed to be incorporated into the parties' agreement.
453. Felder, 487 U.S. at 150 (quoting Henry M. Hart. Jr., The Relations Between State and
Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954)).
454. Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298 (1949); see also Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 31 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("It is settled that a state court must
honor federally created rights and that it may not unreasonably undermine them by invoking
contrary local procedure.").
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bama,455 an action was brought in state court alleging violations of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act.456 The action was dismissed by the
state court when the court, following a state rule of practice, construed
the pleadings "most strongly" against the pleader.457 The Supreme
Court rejected the contention that the state court's local practice of
construction of the complaint was binding upon it.458 The federal
right of having the court construe the complaint itself to determine if
the claimant had been denied a right to trial granted to him by Con-
gress could not be defeated by "forms of local practice. '459 While a
state court could impose such strict rules on the assertion of state con-
ferred rights, it could not do so with respect to federally created rights.
A similar result was reached in Felder v. Casey.460 There, the issue
was whether a state court could apply a state notice-of-claim rule to a
section 1983 claim.461 Wisconsin required that before a plaintiff could
sue a governmental entity or officer, he or she must first notify the
potential defendant or defendants of the circumstances giving rise to
the claim, the amount of the claim and his or her intention to hold the
person notified liable.4 62 The plaintiff was also required to postpone
filing suit for 120 days after providing notice to give the potential de-
fendants the opportunity to consider the relief requested.463 Failure
to comply with the rule resulted in a dismissal of the action.464 The
Supreme Court held it improper, under the Supremacy Clause, for the
state court to apply the state rule to the federal civil rights action,
notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff voluntarily chose to bring
the action in state court.465 The Court held that the Supremacy
Clause imposes upon the state court a constitutional duty to "proceed
in such manner that all the substantive rights of the parties under con-
trolling federal law [are] protected. ' '466 The Court further stated:
Wisconsin, however, may not alter the outcome of federal claims it
chooses to entertain in its courts by demanding compliance with
outcome-determinative rules that are inapplicable when such claims
are brought in federal court, for "'[w]hatever springes the State may
455. 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
456. Id. at 294.
457. Id. at 295.
458. Id. at 296.
459. Id.
460. 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
461. Id. at 134.
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 138.
466. Id. at 151 (quoting Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245 (1942)).
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set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that the State con-
fers, the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably
made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice.' ' 467
The Court was particularly concerned with the effect of the notice-of-
claim statute on the assertion of a claim based on the federal civil
rights laws.468 It found that the Wisconsin statute, designed as a con-
dition precedent to recovery in all civil rights actions, had the effect of
reducing the time period within which to bring suit.469
The Court's analysis in Brown and in Felder provides a framework
for determining the appropriateness of a specific procedural rule ap-
plicable in an SRO arbitral forum. It would be axiomatic that an arbi-
tral forum handling a federal claim is not held to the same set of rules
as that of a state court when handling a federal claim.
An SRO arbitral forum handles claims based on federal and state
law and claims based on violations of SRO rules. Like a state court
hearing federal claims or a federal court hearing state claims, the pro-
cedural rules of the arbitral forum should apply unless they impose
unnecessary burdens upon the right to recover under the law of the
claim being asserted. 470 When the forum is resolving federal and state
law claims, its rules should thus be examined to determine whether
any of them impose unnecessary burdens upon the right to recovery
authorized by that law. Thus far, no court has undertaken this inquiry
with respect to the eligibility rule. When arbitration was initially
viewed with judicial hostility, it was because of a fear that its process,
lack of procedures and informality would not protect federal statutory
rights. A reexamination of the arbitration process led the Court to
deem it adequate. When engaged in that reexamination, the Court
was not concerned with the burdens imposed by an arbitral forum's
procedures. Rather, the concern centered on just the opposite, that is
whether, in view of the informality and lack of procedures, federal
statutory rights could nonetheless be protected. In view of the eligi-
bility rule, the time has now come for the courts to examine the bur-
den the rule imposes on the right to recovery under either state or
federal law.
467. Id. at 152 (quoting Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1949)).
468. Id. at 137.
469. Id. at 143-44.
470. The arbitral forum may apply its rules, in their entirety, to causes of action based on
violations of their own rules. In Brown, the Court made it clear that although certain rules may
not be applicable when a state court is entertaining a federal claim, those same rules may indeed
be applicable when the state court is handling claims derived from rights the state conferred. 338
U.S. at 298-99.
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The eligibility rule undoubtedly imposes a burden on the right to
seek redress; it is a condition precedent to recovery in the arbitral
forum. It is outcome-determinative, like the notice-of-claim rule in
Felder. If a claimant has a cause of action which is timely pursuant to
the applicable statute of limitations, the action may proceed in state
court or federal court. It could not proceed, however, in the arbitral
forum if, even though timely, six years elapsed from the occurrence or
event giving rise to the suit. Thus, the outcome of that claim will de-
pend upon where it is brought. If a state court cannot apply outcome
determinative rules to federal claims, then arbitral forums should be
barred as well from applying the eligibility rule to state and federal
claims. The same is true for a federal court hearing a state law claim.
The federal court may not impose its own substantive, outcome-
determinative law on the matter; it must apply state law to state law
claims.471
An arbitral forum should not be deemed immune from these rules
because it has "consensual" jurisdiction. It cannot be asserted that
because the parties consented to the arbitral forum, they consented to
the application of any procedural rule, even those that are outcome
determinative. The Court rejected this precise argument in Felder.472
There it was argued that litigants who chose a state court forum for
the vindication of a federal right did so to take advantage of certain
procedural rules and, having taken advantage of these rules, must also
comply with those procedural rules less to their liking.473 This "bitter-
with-the-sweet argument" 474 did not persuade the Court. The Court
stated that "states may make the litigation of federal rights as conge-
nial as they see fit-not as a quid pro quo for compliance with other,
uncongenial rules, but because such congeniality does not stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress' goals. '475 Likewise, ar-
bitral forums may make the vindication of claims based on either state
or federal law as informal, expeditious or simple as they see fit, but
the fact that such advantages have been found to be adequate in the
protection of federal statutory rights does not give an arbitral forum
the license to tread upon the very rights being vindicated by the appli-
cation of burdensome procedural rules. The fact that the plaintiff in
Felder voluntarily chose state court did not mean that he was required
to give up substantive rights he would have had absent that choice.
471. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
472. 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
473. Id. at 150.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 151.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Similarly, the fact that an investor may be deemed to have "con-
sented" to the arbitral forum does not mean that he or she must relin-
quish substantive rights that he or she would have had absent the
arbitration clause.
Like the notice-of-claim statute in Felder, the eligibility rule is more
than a mere rule of procedure.476 It is an outcome-determinative rule
that limits an investor's right to sue a broker-dealer and as such un-
dermines the state and federal substantive law granting the investor
the cause of action. The causes of action asserted in arbitration are
derived from state and federal law, which already contain their own
statutes of limitations. The SROs' attempt to alter those limitation
periods for their own convenience 477 is improper. If a state court may
not "vindicate the substantive interests underlying a state rule of deci-
sion at the expense of a federal right, '478 an arbitral forum may not do
so either. Accordingly, the rule should be eliminated.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a federal policy favoring arbitration. That is because arbi-
tration is, for the most part, an effective, efficient, and economical al-
ternative dispute resolution process. It can greatly benefit a party by
giving him or her a forum to pursue a claim that he or she may other-
wise not have been able to pursue; by having a fact finder with exper-
tise and understanding of the intricacies of the dispute; and by having
an arbitrator, while subject to the law, not strictly bound by it so that
"justice" can be achieved. The federal policy and the theoretical ben-
efits of arbitration, however, cannot support the wholesale endorse-
ment of securities arbitration. Securities arbitration is a special case
deserving special analysis and treatment. When determining the legal-
ity or applicability of an SRO arbitration rule, courts and arbitrators
alike must be guided by the fact that the securities industry makes the
rules that are applicable in each SRO arbitral forum and that the in-
vestor has no bargaining power to amend or obtain waiver of those
rules. Accordingly, interpretation and construction of the arbitration
agreement and the SRO procedural rules governing arbitration should
be done in a manner that does not deprive the customer of claims or
substantive rights the customer would have had absent the agreement
to arbitrate.
476. Id. at 152.
477. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing the eligibility rule's original intent
as a "convenience").
478. Felder, 487 U.S. at 152.
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The control of the arbitral process by the securities industry has re-
sulted in investors being placed in a position where they are forced to
relinquish substantive rights for the benefit of being a participant in
the capital market. For the most part, courts have upheld that relin-
quishment by failing to take into account the unique position of the
investor and the assumption underlying the Supreme Court's endorse-
ment of arbitration. Instead of the wholesale endorsement of securi-
ties arbitration, the courts should treat the SRO arbitral forum as it
would treat a state or federal court forum and examine whether the
procedures applicable in the forum tread upon federal or state sub-
stantive rights. That examination should lead to the abandonment of
the eligibility rule.

